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I. INTRODUCTION: LABOR AND SOCIAL ISSUES WILL PLAY A VITAL
ROLE IN THE EC SINGLE MARKET
The United States media have extensively covered the trade angle of
the European Communities [EC]1 program to create a "single market"
by the end of 1992.2 The media coverage has spotlighted the benefits the
1 The European Communities, or EC, is the collective term for the twelve European countries,
or member states, which ratified three 1950's treaties creating a union of economic and energy re-
source policies. For a discussion of the EC's membership, see infra notes 44, 47 and accompanying
text; for citations to and discussions of the three EC treaties, see infra notes 44-45 and accompanying
text.
2 See, eg., Brimelow, The Dark Side of 1992, Forbes, Jan. 22, 1990, at 85; Stout, In a Major
Turnaround, US. Is Posting Surplus in Trade with Europe, Wall St. J., July 10, 1990, at Al, col. 6;
Revzin, Economists See Europe Carrying the U.S., Wall St. J., May 17, 1990, at A2, col. 2; Forman,
Europe's Banks Grapple with Sea Change, Wall St. J., May 17, 1990, at Al1, col. 1; World Business"
Euro-Man (Special Report), Wall St. J., Sept. 22, 1989, § R; Greenhouse, Europeans Unite to Com-
pete with Japan and U.S., N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1989, at 1, col. 4. On how EC business views U.S.
companies' movement to Europe, see Batchelor, Why Americans Are Setting up over There, The
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EC market will offer multinational corporations, such as the market's
"economies of scale" and its 320 million consumer block.3 By now this
1992 news has sunk in, and many United States corporations are assess-
ing how they might exploit the soon-to-be unified EC market.4
Financial Times (London), Oct. 30, 1990, at 18, col. 1 ("[e]very small and medium sized U.S. com-
pany which does come to Europe represents a challenge to the local business community"). See
generally CLIFFORD CHANCE, THE CCH GUIDE TO 1993: CHANGES IN EEC LAW 1 (1989) (objec-
tive of single market program is "to create one market comprising 323 million people in which
Community industry can compete on equal terms"); The European Community's Program for a
Single Market in 1992, 89 DEP'T ST. BULL. 23, 23 (Jan. 1989) [hereinafter European Community
Dep't of State Bull. Article] (U.S. position on U.S. effect of EC Single Market Program); Meessen,
Europe en Route to 1992: The Completion of the Internal Market and its Impact on Non-Europeans,
23 INT'L LAW 359, 370 (1989) (single market will create "opportunities of scale" and "flexible
business strategies" paralleling "those of Europe's American and Japanese competitors"). For dis-
cussions of the changes which the single market program could bring to the U.S. and EC legal
communities, see LAGUETTE & LATHAM, LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 237-67
(1987); Europe 1992 (Special Report), Nat'l L.J., Oct. 1, 1990, at 15; Thieffry, New Legal Landscape
in Europe, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 16, 1989, at 15, col. 4; Sontag, Planning for 1992, Nat'l L.J., May 15,
1989, at 1, col. 1.
3 See, e.g., Revzin, Europeans Foresee Era ofProsperity, Unity and Growing Power;, Wall St. J.,
July 5, 1990, at Al, col. 6; Clark, Europe '92? It's Mostly a Break for the Americans, Wall St. J., May
31, 1990, at A18, col. 3. See generally Completing the Internal Market: An Area without Internal
Frontiers, the Progress Report Required by Article 8B of the Treaty, COM (88) 650 final [hereinaf-
ter EC Progress Report 1988], at 2 (November 17, 1988) (acknowledging the oft-cited prediction in
P. CECCHINI, THE EUROPEAN CHALLENGE 1992: THE BENEFITS OF A SINGLE MARKET (1988)
that single market will create 5% growth in EC's gross community product, 6% average reduction
in prices, and 2,000,000 new jobs).
The EC's single market seems to have inspired the sincerest form of flattery: the three continen-
tal North American countries are planning an EC-inspired single market. See Baer, Mexico's Race
against the Clock, Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1989, at A13, col. 3 (Canada, Mexico, and U.S. are planning
a "partnerhip... propelled by the emerging global trading blocs in Europe and the Pacific Basin").
Similarly, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay are planning to create their own single
economic market by "the start of 1994." Free Trade Moves South, THE ECONOMIST, July 14, 1990,
at ("a genuine Brazil-Argentina common market [to be formed] by the start of 1994 [eventually may
include] Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay.. ."); cf. Kamm, Latin America Edges toward Free Trade,
Wall St. J., Nov. 30, 1990, at All, col. 1 ("[b]y the end of 1994, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and
Uruguay are planning a tarrif-free common market"). The North and South American markets may
even combine, creating a "free trade zone spreading from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego." Id. This
potential market is often "compare[d] ... to the European Community's" single market program.
Id.
4 By the early 1990's, U.S. businesses of all sizes understood that the EC's single market pro-
gram offers a unique potential for profit. See, eg., Magee, 1992: Moves Americans Must Make,
HARv. BUS. Rv., May-June 1989, at 78, 79-80; Stein, European Foreign Affairs System and the
Single European Act of 1986, 23 INT'L LAW 977, 979 (1989); Note, Toward a Single European
Capital Market: The European Economic Community's Directive to Liberalize Capital Flows, 20
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 139 (1988).
While major U.S.-based corporations have had a European presence for years, to buttress mar-
ket positions in post-1992 Europe, smaller U.S. businesses are increasingly moving beyond exports
and forming European distributorships, joint ventures, and branch operations. See generally Hold-
ing Pep Rallies for 1992, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 6, 1989, at 60; Confusion Marks Smaller Firms' Views on
a Unified European Market, Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 1990, at B2, col. 3; Boyer, Firms Ready for Europe,
Cincinnati Enquirer, July 22, 1990, at II, col. 2; Kingon, The Next Step toward One Europe, Wall St.
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Originally, United States corporations focused on whether the
breakdown in inter-European trade barriers would affect outsiders' ac-
cess to the EC; many corporations feared a "Fortress Europe" might
exclude easy access to the new single market.5 Yet while United States
corporations' concern over the "Fortress Europe" issue may remain im-
portant,6 it does not go far enough. The initial question many United
J., Dec. 19, 1989, at A15, col. 4. The EC's planned breakdown in nationalistic protections and
customs formalities alone promises real savings for business operating in the EC. In one oft-cited
example, the EC truck driver hauling a load across a few member states could, after 1992, see his
paperwork reduced from 35 documents to one. Eg., Stone, The Globalization of Europe: An Inter-
view with Wisse Dekker, HARV. Bus. REv., May-June 1989, at 90, 91. On United States trade with
the EC generally, see Rawlinson, An Overview of EEC Trade with Non-Community Countries and the
Law Governing these External Agreements, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 205 (1990).
5 As late as 1988, very little publicity in either the United States or Europe had covered the EC
single market program. See Fine, Countdown to 1992: Introduction to the Single Market, 5 CoRP.
CouNs. Q. 52, 52 n.1, 58 (1989) (in early 1988, few European managers even "knew about" the
single market program). But by 1989, United States media coverage on the single EC market had
led United States companies to believe that they would have either to establish viable direct opera-
tions in an EC member state before the end of 1992 or else forever be excluded from operating in the
EC. Eg., Redman, Charging Ahead: Watch out, Washington and Moscow; Flush with Money and
Increasingly Unified, Western Europe Is Marching to Its Own Drummer, TIME, Sept. 18, 1989, at 40;
U.S. Managers Still Focus on Home Front, Wall St. J., July 12, 1989, at B1, col. 2; Revzin, Europe
Will Become Economic Superpower as Barriers Crumble, Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 1989, at Al, col. 6.
The next stage of business opinion in the United States held out the EC as scheming to keep
foreign businesses out, thereby creating a "Fortress Europe" which United States industry would be
able to penetrate only by effective lobbying in Brussels. See 134 CoNG. REc. S16825 (daily ed. Oct.
19, 1988) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller) (U.S. government and business must mobilize a coordi-
nated lobbying effort in Brussels to fight "Fortress Europe"); Browning, Hills Hopes Talks Will
Prevent a Protectionist "Fortress Europe," Wall St. J., Sept. 12, 1989, at A19, col. 4 (U.S. Trade
Representative Carla Hills "is worried... that the European Community is heading toward a pro-
tectionist 'Fortress Europe' "); Lublin, U.S. Food Firms Find Europe's Huge Market Hardly a Piece
of Cake, Wall St. J., May 15, 1990 at Al, col. 6 (EC protectionism in food industry); Meessen, supra
note 2, at 359-60 (EC's single market program as originally articulated might indeed lead to "For-
tress Europe"); Mossberg, As EC Markets Unite, U.S. Exporters Face New Trade Barriers, Wall St.
J., Jan. 19, 1989, at Al, col. 6 (United States resistance to EC import policies rises); Vernon, Can the
U.S. Negotiate for Trade Equality? HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1989, at 96, 100 (given trends in
international trade, the EC has power to create a "Fortress Europe" which would "leave the United
States out of the loop"). European publicity, however, consistently argued that the EC market will
never become an exclusionary "fortress." See Bangemann, Fortress Europe: The Myth, 9 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 480 (1989) (Vice President of EC Commission argues no "Fortress Europe" will
ever exist); Meessen, supra note 2, at 359-60 (EC prefers image and label of "Europe World Part-
ner"). By 1990, even prominent United States politicians and businessmen began to concede that
"Fortress Europe" may not be too realistic a possibility. See, eg., Interview: Paul Volcker, EUROPE,
July-Aug. 1990, at 32, 32 (former Chairman of Board of Governors of U.S. Federal Reserve Board
had, but no longer, "shared the fears of many people that there would be very strong temptations
[within the EC] to turn inward as part of [the] process of perfecting the common market").
6 Brussels openly recognizes that foreigners' concerns regarding "Fortress Europe," when jux-
taposed against internal EC concerns, create difficulties:
[O]n the one hand, fears have been expressed in some quarters within the Community that the
main benefits of the completed Internal Market... will flow to powerful and well-prepared third
country enterprises better equipped now than their Community competitors.... At the other
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States businesses looking toward the EC should ask is whether operating
in even an accessible Europe will be worth it.
As part of its single market program, the EC is standardizing "social
policy" throughout its twelve member states - and in the EC, "social
policy" essentially means worker protections.' The newly-standardized
EC labor and social doctrines will create a "single market for labor" en-
compassing every entity employing European workers after 1992.8 Yet
according to the Harvard Business Review, "the 'social dimensions' of
doing business in Europe" are "more ambiguous than ever," and are only
becoming increasingly "divisive." 9 Because labor costs have a critical
effect on profitability,1° United States-based corporations directly operat-
extreme, certain of the Community's trading partners, without having any concrete evidence to
support their fears, have voiced uneasiness that the completed Internal Market is bound to be
accompanied by measures designed to exclude or at least disadvantage third country interests.
EC Progress Report 1988, supra note 2, at 20.
7 E.g.,A Unified Europe Poses Labor Problems and Prospects for U.S. Firms, Wall St. J., Oct. 17,
1989, at Al, col. 5 [hereinafter Unified Europe] (equating EC single market plan's "social dimen-
sion" with "worker concerns"); Bartley, The Battle of 1992, Wall St. J., March 16, 1989, at A-14,
col. 3 ("the European Community's 'Social Dimension' [includes] such items as the right of every
worker to be covered by a collective bargaining agreement and the creation of European incorpora-
tion statutes providing for worker participation on company boards").
8 Like the United States constitutional "supremacy" doctrine, law at the EC level takes prece-
dence (or "primacy") over any potentially-conflicting doctrine of the European member states. For
a discussion of this key principle underlying all EC law, see Churchill and Foster, European Com-
munity Law and Prior Treaty Obligations of Member States: The Spanish Fishermen's Cases, 36
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 504, 504-07, 509-10, 520-24 (1987); see also European Community Dep't of
State Bull. Article, supra note 4, at 24 (single market "will involve a... significant transfer of author-
ity from member state governments to the EC"); Laug, European Community Constitutional Law:
The Division of Powers between the Community and the Member States, 39 N. IRELAND LEGAL Q.
209, 210-22 (1988) (analyzing division of powers between EC and member states); Thieffry, Van
Doore, & Lowe, The Single European Market: A Practitioner's Guide to 1992, 12 B.C. INT'L &
COMp. L. REv. 357, 359 (1989), reprinted in CORP. COUNS. Q., Oct. 1990, at 54, 56 ("[t]he first
principle [of EC law] is the primacy of Community law over national law within, of course, its field
of applicability").
The proposed EC labor and social doctrines do not distinguish among employers' bases of oper-
ations. In fact, Brussels' few official discussions of employers based outside the EC merely note that
these employers will be subject to the same employment rules as domestic EC employers. See, eg.,
infra text accompanying notes 125 and 150.
9 Friberg, 1992: Moves Europeans are Making, HARv. Bus. REV., May-June 1989, at 85, 85.
10 As this author has said:
Often businesses open foreign operations in order to save productions costs, taking advantage of
Third World labor rates. By contrast, U.S. businesses' motive for opening European facilities is
to gain access to a wealthy end market. The conflict between these two opposite reasons for
going international raises a key issue which U.S. businesses must consider - the labor, or
social, costs of doing business in Europe.
Dowling, Labor Issues Muddy Steps Toward 1992, Cincinnati Enquirer, Sept. 3, 1990, at D2, col. 3.
On the cost advantages of "third world" labor as compared to EC labor, see Third World Offers
Cheap Expert Staff, The Times (London), Nov. 1, 1990, at 19, col. 6. Because labor costs have a
direct effect on a business's profitability, corporations doing business in Europe recognize that they
must account for their labor costs just as they plan for other costs, such as raw materials and taxes.
Worker Rights in the EC
11:564(1991)
ing in the EC11 must consider the possibility that the EC's nascent em-
ployment policy could grow into the greatest drawback to operating in
the European single market after 1992.
Because employment-related social policy has traditionally been
much more worker-protective in Europe than in the United States,12 Eu-
ropean employment doctrines have always been a concern for United
States-based multinational corporations. In the United States, employ-
ment policy in the non-union sector has long been favorable to employ-
ers;"3 by contrast, the "European model" of employment relations
guarantees substantial worker benefits and job tenure protections even
for non-union workers. 14 Only in recent years have United States em-
ployers encountered a domestic trend toward similar worker protec-
tions"5 - and this trend is movement in the direction of the long-
Eg., A Brushoffin Brussels, Wall St. J., Sept. 5, 1990, at A10, col. I ("British entrepreneurs" claim
proposed EC labor legislation "would mean sharply higher operating costs and drive many out of
business"). But cf. Clark, U.S. Unions Did Too Well for Themselves, Wall St. J., June 13, 1990, at
A14, col. 3 (costs of union representation are higher in United States than in Europe, and Japan);
Workers of the World Disunite, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 18, 1990, at 57 (comparing high cost of
unionized United States labor with that of Europe).
11 By "directly operating in the EC," this article means "employing Europeans in Europe." For
an analysis of the various business forms under which a United States business might operate in the
EC, see Magee, supra note 4, at 79. Under Magee's hypothetical, United States-based company A
has manufacturing and distribution operations in several EC member states; B has operations in one
member state; C exports product to the EC, and D has no European business. Companies A and B
would be "directly operating in the EC;" while C and D would not.
Many smaller United States businesses with modest EC operations effectively defer European
employment responsibilities to others, via business organizations such as distributorships, licenses,
and joint ventures. Of course, EC employment doctrines effect even these companies indirectly,
through costs on European partner-employers. Cf. Buckley & Artisien, Policy Issues of Intra-EC
Direct Investment" British, French, and German Multinationals in Greece, Portugal and Spain, with
Special Reference to Employment Effects, in MULTINATIONALS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
105, 123-28 (1988) (J. Dunning & P. Robson, eds.).
12 See Laroque, Towards a New Employment Policy, 128 INT'L LAB. REv. 1 (1989) (Europeans
see employment as providing social protection). See generally Weiss, Individual Employment Rights"
Focusing on Job Security in the Federal Republic of Germany, 67 NEB. L. REv. 82, 82-84 (1988)
(German government requires employers to provide workers with substantially more affirmative
benefits and protections than United States government).
13 See generally infra § II(A).
14 Generally, in continental Europe workers enjoy code-based job protections, and protections
through detailed individual employment contracts which grant employment of "indefinite" duration.
See, ag. Spanish Foreign Trade Institute, A Guide to Business in Spain, Leaflet No. 8, Labor Legis-
lation 6-16 (1988) (analysis of law of "Individual Labor Relations" in Spain, focusing on individual
labor contracts; discussion at page 7 cites Spanish code requirement that individual "labor contracts
are considered to be entered into for indefinite periods of time"). For further background on the
"European model" of national employment laws in EC member states, see, e.g., supra note 12, and
infra note 38. See generally Drovin, Germany's Job Straitjacket, Wall St. J., June 12, 1990 at A16,
col. 3 ("[m]uch rests on Germany's ability to introduce flexibility in work rules, dismissals and
wages").
15 See generally infra § IV.
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established "European model."
While the "European model" of employment law, especially on the
Continent, is a generally cohesive body of worker-protective principles,
the post-1992 "single labor market" will create a more comprehensive
trans-European labor law than has ever existed before. 6 What the new
rules of the employment game will be, though, remains a question on
which leaders within the EC still differ widely. Predictably, the Euro-
pean business sector hopes the EC's political restructuring will allow
member states to rid themselves of the entrenched worker protections
which now keep the relative costs of European production high. Accord-
ing to a German industrialist considering impending changes in the post-
1992 single labor market:
If you compare Europe with the other two big blocks of countries-the
United States and Canada on the one hand, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong
Kong, Singapore, and even China on the other-it is very clear that Europe
has the most costly social structure of the three. As a percentage of wages
and salary, our social charges are about two times those of our competi-
tors .... So we have to find ways and means to make European industry
competitive, both as individual managers and through political changes.
1 7
Yet social-minded EC politicians see the emerging single labor market
not as an opportunity to increase European competitiveness, but as a
chance to expand worker protections at the expense of free market pol-
icy. According to an early and uncharacteristically candid EC commit-
tee report 8 expressing aspirations for the social side of the single market
program:
The unfair distribution of wealth between those [in the EC] who are
involuntarily jobless, and those who defend their jobs at all costs, is paving
the way for a system which may soon only be governable by authoritarian
means. The major changes under way have led to a situation where labour
has become a key factor for equilibrium in our society and in its political
components.
The identification and allocation of new jobs and a new distribution of
labour are thus more than just components of economic and social policy;
they are a prerequisite for safeguarding today's democratic society.'0
This committee's outlook for strong social protections directly contra-
16 See infra § II(D). See generally Symposium: The European Economic Community and 1992,
11 COMP. LAB. L.J. 403 (1990) (articles focusing on effects of EC social policy in Germany, Britain,
Italy, Holland, Spain, Denmark, and Ireland).
17 Stone, supra note 4, at 90, 92 (statement of German industrialist Wisse Dekker) (emphasis
added).
18 Information Report of the Section for Social, Family, Educational and Cultural Affairs on the
Social Aspects of the Internal Market, CES (87) 225 (1987) [hereinafter Section for Social, Family,
Educational, and Cultural Affairs 1987 Report], at § 2.3.2 (September 17, 1987) (emphasis added).
19 Id.
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dicts the German industrialist's hope for a "competitive" post-1992 EC
labor environment. Both cannot prove true. The purpose of this article
is to decide which of these two conflicting visions is the more accurate
prediction of future EC social policy. This article will attempt to chart
the direction in which the EC's post-1992 workers' rights policy is head-
ing, and to explain how this policy direction will affect United States-
based employers operating in the EC.20
To establish context, this article begins by examining how EC work-
ers' rights issues fit into the 1992 single market scheme.21 Next, to chart
the labor and social positions Brussels has taken to date, the article ana-
lyzes the framework of future EC labor and social law by focusing on the
Council's "Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights" and its
detailed implementing document, the Commission's "Social Action Pro-
gram."' 22 Finally, to explicate its thesis that United States multinationals
must actively plan to minimize the new social costs which Brussels is
establishing for the post-1992 EC, this article speculates on where Eu-
rope's still-evolving labor and social rights agenda is heading: Unfortu-
nately for United States employers hoping the EC single market will be a
streamlined producer's paradise, the structure of Europe's emerging "sin-
gle labor market" mixes competition principles with strong worker rights
protections.23
II. How LABOR AND SOCIAL RIGHTS PRINCIPLES FIT INTO THE
SINGLE MARKET PROGRAM
When the EC instituted its single market program agenda in 1985,24
Brussels relegated labor and social rights to an obscured comer, while it
spotlighted a long, specific list of trade problems to be resolved before the
end of 1992.25 Yet this list conspicuously omitted26 issues critical to
20 This article is written from the perspective of a United States-based corporation already famil-
iar with practice under United States federal and state employment law. While EC labor and social
doctrines are, of course, conceptually unrelated to domestic United States law, in order to address
the United States-based employer, this article focuses on differences between proposed EC legal doc-
trines and their closest U.S. counterparts.
21 See infra § II.
22 See infra § III.
23 See infra § IV. European unions' chief goal for the single market is to create stronger EC
worker rights protections. See infra notes 182-183 and accompanying text. However, United States
unions' perspective on the post-1992 EC is entirely different: United States unions fear the single EC
market raises a real potential to take away "American jobs." See, eg., Unification Blues, PENN-
SYLVANIA CONF. REP. oF TEAMsTERS, Fall 1989, at 1.
24 See infra § II(C).
25 See id. This "list" is the annex to the EC White Paper, discussed infra.
26 European Community Dep't of State Bull. Article, supra note 2, at 26 ("[s]ignificant by its
absence from the EC's 1985 White Paper was any mention of social issues, such as workers' rights").
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 11:564(1991)
forming a "single labor market. ' 27 In spite of this omission, Brussels,
from the start of its single market program, openly but quietly signaled
that a "single labor market" one day would blossom into a critical part of
the 1992 agenda.2" Accordingly, a series of formal but obscure EC state-
ments going back almost to the beginnings of the single market program
discloses the structure of the EC's "social Europe" plan, and the princi-
ples which will affect the employment of Europeans after 1992.29 An
understanding of this structure, though, requires a background in the
legal context underlying the EC's concept of a "single labor market."
A. The "European Model" of Employment Relations
The civil or code-based legal systems which govern continental EC
countries present employment law traditions markedly different from
those in the United States3" European employment law, even in Brit-
ain,31 is largely a product of legislated rights guaranteeing workers not
only protections against certain types of discrimination, but also protec-
tions affirmatively assuring job security.3 2 Unlike the common law em-
ployment-at-will concept of "indefinite" employment - which is still the
starting point for non-union United States employment relationships,33
27 Social Dimension of the Internal Market - Commission Working Paper, SEC (88) 1148 final
[hereinafter Social Dimension Working Paper], at § 5 (September 14, 1988) ("[w]ith respect to the
creation of the internal market, social policy must, above all, contribute to the setting up of a 'single
labour market' by doing away with the barriers which still restrict the effective exercise of two basic
freedoms: the freedom of movement of persons and freedom of establishment") (emphasis added).
28 See EC Progress Report 1988, supra note 3, at 3, 9, 13, 15 (progress toward "social Eu-
rope" is a critical EC goal necessary for completing the internal market, yet as of 1988 progress
toward "social Europe" had been slow).
29 See infra § III(A).
30 On the contrast between European civil law and the common law, see, e.g., J.H. MERRYMAN
& D.S. CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERIcAN LEGAL SYS-
TEMs, 73, 77-78, 824-43 (1978); Elliott, Tackling Legal Services in 1992, 132 SOLIC. J. 1576, 1578
(1988); Mackay, Remarks to Notre Dame Law School - London Law Centre, 64 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 461 (1989); Morris, The Road to Brussels - Two Routes Compared, STATUTE L. REv., Spring
1988, at 33; Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 369, 369,
372-85 (1989); see also infra note 342 and accompanying text. This author has elsewhere discussed
certain of the common law's limits, in the context of property rights. Dowling, General Propositions
and Concrete Cases: The Search for a Standard in the Conflict between Individual Property Rights
and the Social Interest, 1 L LAND USE & ENVT'L L. 353 (1985).
31 As in the United States, in Britain prohibitions against employment discrimination are chiefly
statutory. See J. PEEL, THE REAL POWER GAME: A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL RELA-
TIONS 168-73 (1979). See generally infra note 342.
32 See supra note 14.
33 The common law employment relationship was originally a binding and enforceable contract
which was terminable at the will of either party, and employment-at-will is still the starting point of
U.S. employment relationships. Elsewhere, this author has analyzed some of the early case law
explicating the employment-at-will concept. Dowling, A Contract Theory for a Complex Tort: Lim-
iting Interference with Contract beyond the Unlawful Means Test, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 487, 495-96
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European employment of undefined duration effectively includes an im-
plicit assurance of "unlimited" job tenure.34
This assurance goes well beyond the worker-protective legislation
now becoming common in the United States35 In Europe, even non-
union job holders are typically parties to written employment contracts,
which raise many important aspects of employment relationships - in-
cluding the terms of discharge - to the level of law.36 As distinct from
United States practice, workers employed under the "European model"
of employment relations often expect to be able to keep their jobs as long
as they want, or else be bought out at a high price.37
Yet while the "European model" applies broadly throughout the
EC, the specific labor law systems and rules for discharge in each mem-
ber state remain distinct. Until recently, Brussels had stayed out of most
areas of employment relations, including the critical area of how employ-
ers could terminate indefinite-length employment contracts. 38 And dif-
ferences among EC countries' labor laws continue to cause problems for
employers with trans-European operations. As late as 1989, the C.E.O.
(1986) reprinted in 35 DEF. L.J. 503, 512-14 (1986). Increasingly, U.S. employers face litigation in
which former workers allege special promises of long-term employment altered the employment-at-
will relationship. See, eg., Geyelin, Fired Managers Winning More Lawsuits, Wall St. J., Sept. 7,
1989, at Bi, col. 4.
34 Internal and External Adaptation of Firms in Relation to Employment, COM (87) 229 final
[hereinafter Internal and External Adaptation], at § VII (May 13, 1987) (discussing "the traditional
[EC] unlimited employment contract") (emphasis added); see Ramm, Model of a European Individ-
ual Employment Contract, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 378
(Blanpain, ed. 1982) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW] at 381 (model of typical European
employment contract explicitly stating that "duration" of employment is indefinite); Drovin, supra
note 14 (in Germany, "[h]igh levels of job protection... restrict dismissals").
35 Compare supra notes 14 and 34 with supra note 33.
36 See supra note 14.
37 See supra note 34. On unionized labor relations in the EC generally, see BALFOUR, INDUS-
TRIAL RELATIONS IN THE COMMON MARKET 90-102 (1972); FITZGERALD, THE COMMON MAR-
KET'S LABOR PROGRAMS 199-224 (1966); PEEL, supra note 31, at 55-75; 95-102; 168-73;
Commission of the European Communities, Social Policy Series No. 40, Problems and Prospects in
the EEC Member States 82-103; 157-81 (1980); Note, The Vredeling Directive: The EEC's Failed
Attempt to Regulate Multinational Enterprises and Organize Collective Bargaining, 20 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & PoL. 967, 985-87 (1988).
38 Even the Charter and the Social Action Program, discussed infra at § III(C), do not directly
address the key issue of employee firings under indefinite-term contracts. In an April 1990 discus-
sion in Strasbourg, France, a French management labor lawyer predicted to this author that "it
would be 20 years" before the EC imposed any comprehensive community-wide system regulating
discharges under indefinite-length employment contracts. Given the speed with which Brussels is
fashioning a "social Europe" agenda, EC regulations controlling firings of individual employees may
well come more quickly. Certainly, though, no comprehensive set of regulations will exist on this
topic before the end of 1992. Regarding EC employees' redundancy (lay-oft) rights in the business
closing or transfer context, EC regulations already do exist. Cf Note, Employment Protection Rights
on the Transfer of a Business, 52 MOD. L. REv. 691 (1989).
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of a United States multinational corporation with broad European sales
operations predicted that the still-existing differences among the member
states' labor laws would inhibit any true EC single market.39 As exam-
ples, the executive pointed out:
In Britain, sales representatives can be terminated with 90 days' notice.
In Italy, the law doesn't let us dispose of reps so easily. They, in effect, own
their territory. To fire a rep requires paying a penalty based on the rep's
anticipated earnings over a long period of time. In France, anyone who gets
fired must receive severance pay, an amount borne solely by the company.
In Britain, when a worker is made "redundant" the government picks up
part of the check.40
The lament of this C.E.O. is well founded; according to one cynic,
"if all Europe's labor laws were laid end to end, there would be no
end."41 Inconsistencies among the member states' social laws do indeed
hinder a true single market. But it is precisely for this reason that the EC
has intended, all along, to elevate "social Europe" to a key role in the
single market program.42
B. EC Law and Institutions
Employment laws differ so widely among the member states be-
cause, before the advent of the single market program, the EC had regu-
lated so little employment policy. Probably because the EC began as a
trade group,43 Brussels traditionally focused more on the exchange of
finished products and services than on their creation. The roots of to-
day's EC go back to April 1951, when West Germany, Belgium, France,
Holland, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands entered a limited in-
ternational trade affiliation, the "Treaty Establishing the European Coal
and Steel Community."'  Six years later these countries expanded their
relationship, ratifying the "Treaty Establishing the European Economic
39 Kiam, Fortress Europe 1992? Don't Hold Your Breath, Wall St. J., Sept. 11, 1989, at A18, col.
3 (written by CEO of Remington Products Victor K. Kiam).
40 Id. Another U.S. business leader later voiced a similar sentiment:
The feeling [among U.S. businesses operating in Europe] is you need [to employ] a local resident
who understands the mores, the labor laws - the things that are different from country to
country. I would think the way to do it would be to have a local partner in each country.
There are a number of companies that have approached licensers and suggested they [can repre-
sent] the entire Common Market. Personally, I think that's a mistake.
Selz, Europe Offers Expanding Opportunities to Franchisers, Wall St. J., July 20, 1990, at B2, col. 3
(statement of Chairman of International Franchise Association Chairman Arthur Karp).
41 Peel, supra note 31 at 168 (citing a "cynic" as the originator of this quip).
42 See infra § III(A).
43 See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
44 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S.
140.
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Community., 45 As amended, this treaty - commonly referred to sim-
ply as "the Treaty" - is the operative "constitutional" document" un-
derlying all EC law. The Treaty regulates the common market
relationships among the original six signatory countries, plus those six
which ratified the document later: Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Portugal,
Spain, and Britain.47
Just as the United States Constitution establishes the United States
federal government and delineates the roles of its branches, the EC
45 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter "Treaty"]. Simultaneously, these countries also ratified the Treaty Establishing the Eu-
ropean Atomic Energy Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3.
46 The Treaty quite self-consciously sets up its own independent European government - the
Community - with a distinct "legal personality" (Treaty, supra note 45, at art. 210) living on "for
an unlimited period" (id. at art. 240). Yet to preserve the member states' individual identities, the
EC avoids slogans such as "federalism," "country," or "United States of Europe," and Brussels
refuses to refer to the Treaty as a "constitution." See Laug, supra note 8, at 209 (while the EC is a
"federal concept," the "Community is not a State"); Meessen, supra note 2, at 370-71 (EC is less a
nation than a conglomerate of twelve philosophically different governments). Sources outside Brus-
sels are quicker to compare the EC to a federation. Eg., European Community Dep't of State Bull.
Article, supra note 2, at 23 ("[the proposed EC single market would have many features in common
with the fifty American States, which benefit from the efficiencies generated by the free flow of
economic and human resources"). See generally Laug, supra note 8 (analysis of EC Treaty as "con-
stitutional law").
47 Denmark, Ireland, and Britain joined the EC in 1973; Greece joined in 1981; Portugal and
Spain joined in 1986. West Germany's 1990 incorporation of East Germany, to form "Germany," is
not perceived as adding a member state. Eg., The Makings of a New Constellation, THE ECONO-
MIST, Aug. 4, 1990, at 41 (discussing the "special case" of EC growth when "East Germany...
disappears into a united Germany"). See generally East Whaddyamacallit, THE ECONOMIST, Oct.
20, 1990, at 60 (Europeans avoid designating the former "East Germany" by any discrete name).
For discussions of the background and lore behind how the EC came to be, see CLIFFORD
CHANCE, supra note 2, at 1-2; NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, IRELAND IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: PERFORMANCE, PROSPECTS, AND STRATEGY 3-11 (1989); European
Community Dep't of State Bull. Article, supra note 4, at 27-28; Fine, supra note 5, at 52-53; Kirkpat-
rick, The New Europe, 21 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 109, 109-11 (1989); Murphy, The European
Community, the United States and Ireland: An Intermesh of Statutory Provisions, 17 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 665 (1984); Stein, supra note 4, at 978-80; Shildhaus, 1992 and the Single European
Act, 23 INT'L LAW. 549, 549-50 (1989); Europe 92: The Reality, EUROACCESS, Sept.-Oct. 1990, at
24; Revzin, Europe's "Mr. 1992" Is a Tireless Crusader, Wall St. J., June 14, 1989, at A10, col. 1 (on
EC Commission President Jacques Delors); Revzin, Europeans' Nationalist Doubts Creep in as They
Get down to 1992 Nitty-Gritty, Wall St. J., Mar. 3, 1989, at All, col. 2.
The macropolitical structure of Europe has greatly evolved since the end of World War II,
when most European governments were decimated. In Germany just after the war "[t]here was not
even an identifiable legal system." Weyrauch, Gestapo Informants: Facts and Theory of Undercover
Operations, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 553, 558 (1986). In the 1990's, the reunited Germany had
the strongest economic and political position in the EC. See generally Drovin, supra note 14.
Because of the EC's recent successes, other European countries are seeking admission, and the
Community may grow. See Kennedy & Specht, Austrian Membership in the European Communities,
31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 407 (1990); THE MAKINGS OF A NEW CONSTELLATION, supra; Revzin, Fast-
Changing House of Europe Defies Single Blueprint, Wall St. J., Feb. 22, 1990, at A10, col. 3.
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Treaty creates and empowers the EC's decision-making bodies.48 The
Treaty establishes the EC "Council of Ministers," or "Council," granting
it ultimate authority to implement EC law.4 9 This EC law may take sev-
eral forms, collectively known as "instruments": a "directive" requires
each member state to integrate a point of EC policy into its national
law;5" a "regulation" binds member states directly, even without member
state legislation;51 a "decision" addresses fact-specific situations;52 and a
"recommendation" or an "opinion" states a precatory point of EC pol-
icy.53 Under the Treaty's scheme, the Council implements these instru-
ments only by acting upon legislative proposals from the EC
"Commission"; 54 these proposals usually are commented upon and
sometimes approved by the EC "Parliament. '5 5 The Treaty also creates
the EC "Court of Justice," empowering it to settle disputes arising under
48 Treaty, supra note 45, at Part Five, Title I (arts. 137-198).
49 Treaty, supra note 45, at arts. 145-54 (delineating powers of Council). The Council is made
up of the heads of state of the twelve member countries, or - when the Council considers matters
requiring special expertise - the heads of states' designees.
50 Treaty, supra note 45, at art. 189 ("[a] directive shall be binding, as to the result to be
achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities
the choice of form and methods"). See id. art. 100.
51 Id. at art. 189 ("[a] regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety
and directly applicable in all Member States").
52 Id. ("[a] decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed").
53 Id. ("[riecommendations and opinions shall have no binding force"). For more detailed expli-
cations of the differences among directives, regulations, decisions, recommendations, and opinions,
see CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 2, at 17-22, 108; McMAHON & MURPHY, EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY LAW IN IRELAND 235-60 (1989); Thieffry, Van Doom & Lowe, supra note 8, at 359-61;
Brimelow, supra note 2, at 85; Europe 92: The Reality, supra note 47, at 26.
54 Treaty, supra note 45, at arts. 155-63 (delineating powers of Commission). The Treaty specifi-
cally empowers the Commission with responsibility over "employment," "social" concerns, "labour
law and working conditions," and related areas. Id. at art. 118.
55 Treaty, supra note 45, at arts. 137-44 (delineating powers of Parliament). Therefore, "Parlia-
ment's actual influence on policymaking is quite restricted." Note, A Community within the Com-
munity: Prospects for Foreign Policy Integration in the European Community, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1066, 1079 (1990). The Parliament's Treaty-authorized role - which is essentially limited to mere
"consultation" - is a controversial topic among EC leaders and parliamentarians. Parliament, not
surprisingly, complains of being the world's only directly-elected would-be legislative body with no
real lawmaking power. During 1990 and beyond, the Council scheduled summit meetings on EC
"political union," with a goal of re-writing the Treaty itself. Parliament openly advocated such a
union, largely with the goal of increasing its own power. See What's Cooking in Brussels, THE
ECONOMIST, Feb. 24, 1990, at 45; Riding, Defining the New Europe" EC Summit to Grapple with
"Union," Int'l Herald Trib., Apr. 28-29, 1990, at 1, col. 1; Nelson, Kohl Champions Early EC Polit-
ical-Unity Talks, Wall St. J., Mar. 30, 1990, at A8, col. 3. Parliament's power is critical to the state
of EC social affairs, because Parliament is the EC's most openly-socialist body - and it is the one
EC branch which has historically championed labor and social rights. See infra note 167. For a
complete explication of Parliament's procedures and the number of seats of each member state, see
Act Concerning the Election of the Representatives of the European Parliament by Direct Universal
Suffrage, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 278) (October 8, 1976).
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Treaty-created law. 56
The steps in the EC law-making process, then, begin when the Com-
mission issues a "proposal" for a directive or other legislation, sometimes
upon the advice of an EC committee.5 7 Next, Parliament comments
upon the proposal, sometimes requesting changes, which the Commis-
sion may decide to adopt by amending the proposal, often resubmitting it
to Parliament. 8 Finally, if the Council ratifies the proposal, it becomes
EC legislation. 9 The Court of Justice interprets the legislation and any
challenges to its legal status.'
C. The White Paper and the Single European Act
Besides establishing the EC institutions and law-making procedure,
the 1957 version of the Treaty of Rome envisioned an integrated eco-
nomic entity much like the single market only now being fashioned in
Brussels. 6 1 Therefore, for a while after the 1957 Treaty ratification,
Europeans expected to become part of a truly unified single market.62
But for various reasons, the EC put off its single market goal; 63 the con-
56 Treaty, supra note 45, at arts. 164-88 (delineating powers of Court of Justice). For a complete
explication of Court of Justice procedures, see Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the
European Economic Community (April 17, 1957). On the jurisdictional conflict over the power to
adjudicate individuals' EC law rights between the EC Court of Justice and the European Court of
Human Rights in Strasbourg, see Guilford & Gibb, Move to Open EC Laws to Private Court Chal-
lenge, The Times (London), Nov. 1, 1990, at 9, col. 6. For a discussion of the respective roles of the
Commission, Parliament, Council, and Court of Justice as branches of EC government, see CLIF-
FORD CHANCE, supra note 2, at 101-08; Kennedy & Specht, supra note 47, at 441-49.
57 Treaty, supra note 45, at Part Five, Title I (arts. 137-98). For an analysis of these and other
provisions in the context of the steps in the EC lawmaking procedure, see CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra
note 2, at 17-22.
58 Treaty, supra note 45, at Part Five, Title I (arts. 137-98).
59 Id.
60 Id. On the Court of Justice's role in the labor and social area, see Harris, A Brief Review of the
Court's Present Role, 139 NEW L.J. 443 (1989). For more detailed explications of the respective
roles of the Council, Commission, Parliament, and the Court of Justice, see supra note 53. On the
steps in the EC directive-making process specific to social law, see Note, The Final Directive Equal
Social Security Benefits for Men and Women in the European Economic Community, 12 B.C. INT'L
& COMP. L. REv. 437, 439 n.21 (1989).
61 Treaty, supra note 45, at arts. 210-40; see MacLachlan and Mackesy, Acquisitions of Compa-
nies in Europe - Practicability, Disclosure, and Regulation: An Overview, 23 INT'L LAW. 373, 399
(1989) ("[i]n effect, the 1992 program is a crash program designed to complete the structure devised
[in 1957 Treaty]"); Meessen, supra note 2, at 360 (original 1957 Treaty had set out timetable, which
ultimately was never met, for completion of a single market).
62 See supra note 61.
63 See CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 2, at 12-16 (analyzing why the "internal market first
envisaged some 30 years ago" initially "failed," but ultimately re-emerged in the 1980's and 1990's).
The first wave of "Europhoria" died out in the early 1960's, when the EC entered a period of
"Eurosclerosis" lasting until the mid-1980's. During the "Eurosclerosis" period, "when visitors [to
Brussels] asked 'How many people work in the European Commission?' the cynical answer was
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cept of a united European market with a single identity remained sus-
pended until the mid-1980's, when the Council revived it in a series of
formal suggestions."
Responding to these Council suggestions, on June 14, 1985 the
Commission issued a "White Paper" to the Council, setting forth a con-
crete agenda for the EC's single market.65 The White Paper set the fa-
mous deadline by which the new market would be completed: December
31, 1992.66 In its call for a real union of the EC's 320 million citizens,
the White Paper set out a plan for eliminating three categories of "barri-
ers" which divide the twelve member states: physical barriers, technical
barriers, and fiscal barriers.67 Yet while the White Paper fleetingly ad-
dressed a need to achieve "social" as well as economic union,6 1 the docu-
ment conspicuously omitted a category for "social" barriers.69
The White Paper's three-way division of single market barriers
quickly became the organizational structure behind the entire single mar-
ket program, and into the 1990's, this division still controlled how the
EC charted progress toward its single market goal.70 In an "Annex," the
'About 60%.'" Waste a Lot, Want a Lot, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 6, 1990, at 60. On the EC's initial,
1950's wave of "Europhoria," see SMITH, THE GLOBAL BANKERS 32 (1989); on the "Eurosclerosis"
period, see id. at 225; on the 1980's rebirth of "Europhoria," see id. at 244, 377.
64 See citations in Completing the Internal Market, White Paper from the Commission to the
European Council, COM (85) 310 final [hereinafter "White Paper"], at 7 2-4 (June 14, 1985)
(although the Treaty had originally proposed a single EC market, only in March 1985 did the Coun-
cil set the 1992 goal for completion). The Commission is credited with first having come up with the
"1992" goal, on March 6, 1985. Fine, supra note 5, at 53.
65 White Paper, supra note 64. For discussions of the importance of the White Paper as the
operative EC declaration which gave birth to and structured the single market program, see CLIF-
FORD CHANCE, supra note 2, at 3; European Community Dep't of State Bull. Article, supra note 2,
at 24; Meessen, supra note 2, at 360; Thieffry, Van Doom, & Lowe, supra note 8, at 357; Note, supra
note 4, at 139.
66 White Paper, supra note 64, at j 2-3. Because of the "December 31" date, the buzz-word
"1992" is a misnomer: It should be "1993." The single market may not be completed even by this
date. E.g., Nelson, Sticking Points Is the 1992 Timetable for European Integration Too Optimistic?,
Wall St. J., Sept. 21, 1990, at R31, col. 1 (some aspects of single market program are behind
schedule).
67 White Paper, supra note 64, at %1 24-218. For background on the relation between these
"barriers" and the "social Europe" concept, see Fine, supra note 5, at 54-56.
68 White Paper, supra note 64, at 20 (noting that single market will strengthen EC "social...
policy"); CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 2, at 50 (discussing those aspects of White Paper involving
social matters).
69 See supra note 26.
70 The EC measures progress toward the single market with annual listings chronicling which of
the White Paper's called-for instruments had been drafted, approved, and implemented. The EC
retains its grouping of these instruments under the White Paper's three topics of barriers. See, e.g.,
Fifth Report of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Concerning the Imple-
mentation of the White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market, COM (90) 90 final [herein-
after EC White Paper Implementation Report 1990], at $% 40-92; Fourth Progress Report of the
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White Paper listed almost 300 topics needing "harmonization," on which
specific EC legislation would have to be passed and implemented before
the end of 1992. 71 The White Paper and its Annex categorized each
topic needing harmonization under one of the three barriers.72 As exam-
ples, "technical barriers" included safety of toys,73 public procurement of
services,74 and rollover protection for agricultural vehicles;75 "physical
barriers" included arms control,7 6 "customs formalities,"7 7 and veteri-
nary controls of swine fever;7" and "fiscal barriers" included cigarette
taxes,79 general excise taxes,8 0 and value added taxes.8 1
To give the White Paper's single market program the full force of
Treaty law, in early 1986 the member states ratified the "Single Euro-
pean Act," amending the Treaty of Rome itselft2 and making the single
market program the functional equivalent of constitutional law. 3 Effec-
tive July 1, 1987, the Act made the single market program mandatory:
"[t]he Community shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively
establishing the internal market over a period expiring on 31 December
1992 ... ."'4 To ensure the EC could indeed attain the 1992 deadline,
the Act realigned the roles of the EC's political institutions - the Coun-
cil, Commission and Parliament. To do this, the Act reformed the EC
decision-making process by abolishing a former practice of unanimous
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Concerning the Implementation of the
Commission's White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market, COM (89) 311 final [hereinaf-
ter EC White Paper Implementation Report 1989], at 40-98.
71 White Paper, supra note 64, at Annex. "Harmonization" is the "Eurospeak" word for the
process of ensuring that the member states' laws are uniform on a given topic.
72 Id.
73 Id. at part A.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at part B.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at part C.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Single European Act, Feb. 17, 1986, 29 O. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) (1987) (effective July 1,
1987). On why the Single European Act is the sine qua non of the EC single market, see Laug, supra
note 8, at 222-23; Sherlock, Sovereignty, the Constitution, and the Single European Act, 9 DUBLIN U.
L.J. 101 (1987); Thieffry, Van Doom, & Lowe, supra note 8, at 357; Usher, The Institutions of the
European Communities after the Single European Act, 19 BRACTON L.J. 64, 64-69 (1987). The Sin-
gle European Act fostered such extensive growth toward a true single market that by 1990 Brussels
proposed rewriting the entire Treaty, forging a new political union. See supra note 55.
83 On the "constitutional" character of the Treaty as amended by the Single European Act, see
supra note 46. On how the Single European Act implements the EC single market program, see
CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 2, at 2; MacLachlan and Makesy, supra note 61, at 399; Meessen,
supra note 2, at 361; Shildhaus, supra note 47, at 550-51.
84 Single European Act, supra note 82, at art. 13, amending Treaty, supra note 45, at art. 8(a).
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agreement among Council representatives, substituting for it a "qualified
majority" Council voting system for most areas - but not, ostensibly,
for labor and social topics.8 5 Thus, while the changes which the Single
European Act made to the Treaty induced rapid development in many
parts of the White Paper's three-barrier program, 6 they did not stimu-
late immediate growth in the EC's nascent single labor market.
8 7
D. The EC's Progress toward a Single Labor and Social Policy
Just as the White Paper had restricted the growth of the EC work-
ers' rights program by conspicuously omitting labor and social issues
from the three-barrier program, 8 the Single European Act initially re-
strained the single labor market by openly separating out labor issues.
While the Act's new "qualified majority" voting system applied to almost
all of the White Paper program, it expressly did not apply in much of the
worker rights area. Instead, for EC legislation "relating to the rights and
interests of employed persons," the Act purported to retain the old unan-
imous approval mechanism.89 Thus, while the text of both the White
Paper and the Single European Act pay homage to the importance of
"social Europe,"9 0 both documents effectively relegate labor and social
85 Single European Act, supra note 82, at arts. 14, 16, 17, 18, amending Treaty, supra note 45, at
arts. 8b, 28, 57(2), 99, 100a. The key question of whether the Treaty requires Council unanimity for
labor and social issues is treated infra at notes 169-178 and accompanying text. "Qualified major-
ity" means a vote weighted upon the member states' population. Member states' votes range from
ten (Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom) to two (Luxembourg). Treaty, supra note 45, at art.
148 § 2.
86 The Commission's annual White Paper progress reports, discussed supra at note 70 (which are
distinct from the two single market progress reports mandated by the Single European Act, supra
note 82, at art. 14, amending Treaty, supra note 45, at art. 8b; see eg., EC Progress Report 1988,
supra note 3), carefully track the year-by-year progress of the White Paper program. See, eg., EC
White Paper Implementation Report 1990, supra note 70; EC White Paper Implementation Report
1989, supra note 70; Third Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment on the Implementation of the Commission's White Paper on the Completion of the Internal
Market, COM (88) 134 final [hereinafter EC White Paper Implementation Report 1988]. The 1990
Implementation Report, supra, at 20-31, summarizes the respective roles which the four EC
institutions played in effecting progress under the White Paper agenda through early 1990.
87 In its 1988 White Paper progress report, the Commission lamented that "[ijt is regrettable
that some Member States, despite the terms of the Single European Act, still contest the Commu-
nity's competence where people as such are concerned." EC White Paper Implementation Report
1988, supra note 86, at % 28; see also EC Progress Report 1988, supra note 3, at 13-15 (com-
plaining that progress toward "Citizens' Europe" has been slow).
88 See supra note 27.
89 Single European Act, supra note 82, at art. 18 amending Treaty, supra note 45, at art. 100a;
see infra notes 169-178.
90 White Paper, supra note 64, at % 20; Single European Act, supra note 82, at arts. 21-23; see EC
White Paper Implementation Report, supra note 70, at 5 ("social cohesion" and "social policy" are
goals "inextricably linked" to the Treaty and to "the central objective of a single European mar-
ket"); EC Progress Report 1988, supra note 3, at $ 24 ("one critical aspect of removing European
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issues to the single market program's back seat, leaving trade matters up
front.9
1
Brussels's priority of trade before social issues seems to have been
carefully considered. Initially, two sectors - Europe's business commu-
nity and Britain under former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher - op-
posed a cohesive "social Europe," urging instead a single market
program limited to trade.92 While the official EC position held that
Brussels would not allow a single market which condoned "social dump-
ing" of EC workers,93 Brussels appears implicitly to have recognized the
political reality that during the single market program's infancy, "social
Europe" was too volatile a concept to promote openly.9 4 As Brussels
undoubtedly suspected from the beginning, had the business community
and Britain initially made a bigger issue of their opposition to a "social
Europe," the whole 1992 program might have gone the way of the 1957
Treaty's initial push for a single market. 95
To avoid this fate, the EC set out to win a broad commitment to its
1992 program by emphasizing the single market's least controversial an-
frontier controls is letting Europeans know that people are as important as goods"). The Treaty has
always addressed certain fundamental EC social issues. See Treaty, supra note 45, at Part Three,
Title III (arts. 117-128).
On how the "social Europe" concept and European labor principles have historically fit into the
EC and its regulation of trade, see generally CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 2, at 49-50; FrrZGER-
ALD, supra note 37; FOGARTY, WORK AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY (1975) (Chatham House European Series No. 24); HOLLOWAY, SOCIAL POLICY
HARMONISATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1981); THE SOCIAL POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES (Kapteyn ed. 1977); MCMAHON & MURPHY, supra note 53, at 490-517; NATIONAL
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, supra note 47, at 497-517; Schnorr, European Communities, in
COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 65, supra note 34.
91 See infra notes 92-108 and accompanying text. See generally infra text accompanying notes
155-181.
92 On the European business community's opposition to "social Europe," see infra notes 170-
178, 185, and accompanying text. On Thatcher's opposition to "social Europe," see infra notes 102-
103, 170-178, 185, and accompanying text, and see Longworth, European Nations Step Closer toward
Unity, Chicago Trib., Dee. 9, 1989, at 4, col. 2.
93 "Social dumping" is the slogan EC unionists use to convey their fear that free European trade
will both cause industry to abandon higher-wage Northern Europe, and exploit Mediterranean
workers by denying them needed workplace protections and benefits. The EC "social dumping"
concept goes back to League of Nations debates in the 1920's. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EMPLOYMENT, SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND EDUCATION,
SOCIAL EUROPE: THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF THE INTERNAL MARKET, SPECIAL EDITION (1988)
[hereinafter SOCIAL EUROPE SP. ED.], at § 3.2.1.1.
94 See generally Revzin, Unity Drive Feeds EC Bureaucrats' Power, Wall St. J., July 27, 1989, at
A8, col. 1 (arguing that by mid-1989 widespread commitment to single market program within EC
allowed "the EC's bureaucrats [to] branc[h] ... fast into previously forbidden areas" including
"writing a European Charter of Fundamental Social Rights").
95 On the fate of the 1957 Treaty's initial push for a single market, see supra text accompanying
notes 61-64.
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gle - efficient trade, economies of scale, and a 320 million consumer
block.96 With the spotlight trained on commercial advantages, the Euro-
pean business community, for one, fell in as an avid supporter of the 1992
movement."7 By 1989, the Commission was able to acknowledge an
"irreversible" commitment 98 to the single market program among busi-
ness leaders, and among Europeans generally.
Emboldened by this commitment, late in 1989 the Commission is-
sued a "Social Charter" and an implementing document called the "So-
cial Action Program," which together specifically outline how the EC
plans to implement worker rights.99 By 1990, the EC worker rights ques-
tion had become a hot topic, 1' and Brussels openly acknowledged that
the drive toward "social cohesion" in the EC "cannot be dissociated
from" the White Paper program itself. 0 1 Thus, in a matter of just a few
years, "social Europe" had evolved from a whispered rumor to a verita-
ble fait accompli.
The wave of enthusiasm for a single labor market, though, was
slower in reaching Margaret Thatcher's Britain. During the 1992 pro-
gram's early years, Britain had stood as a hold-out, agreeing only in con-
cept to a breakdown of trade barriers, and refusing to relinquish power to
96 See supra notes 3-4, 65-67, and accompanying text.
97 Major EC businesses strongly support the move toward a single market. See supra note 2.
However, insofar as the new EC market will eliminate the member states' historic protections of
local businesses - including especially nationalism in the public procurement sector - less competi-
tive EC businesses are almost certain to fail as a result of the 1992 program. E.g., Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 94, at A-4 (May 15, 1990) (statement of Zygmunt Tyszkiewicz, Secretary-General of
UNICE, Union des Confed6rations de l'Industrie et des Employeurs d'Europe, that contrary to
frequent assertions otherwise, the single market program is a "kick in the backside" for EC busi-
nesses because "[i]ncreased competition within the [EC] market will expose 'weak companies for
what they are' "); see infra note 187.
98 According to the Commission's report on the progress of the White Paper program issued in
March 1990, "[i]rreversibility and anticipation have characterized [the EC's] work [toward a single
market] in recent months." EC White Paper Implementation Report 1990, supra note 70, at 7.
99 Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, COM (89) 568 final [hereinafter Charter]
(November 29, 1989) (implemented by eleven heads of state at Strasbourg Council meeting on De-
cember 9, 1989); Communication from the Commission Concerning its Action Programme Relating
to the Implementation of the Community Charter of Basic Social Rights for Workers, COM (89) 568
final [hereinafter Social Action Program] (November 29, 1989). For analyses of these documents,
see Bercusson, The European Community's Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, 53
MOD. L. REv. 624 (1990); Hepple, The Implementation of the Community Charter of Fundamental
Social Rights, 53 MOD. L. REv. 643 (1990).
100 See, ag., More Rights for the Workers, THE ECONOMIST, July 28, 1990, at 60 (Commission's
commitment to "social Europe" is "irrepressibl[e]"); Brother, We Just Missed the 1992 Balloon, THE
ECONOMIST, June 23, 1990, at 61 ("[u]nion leaders are particularly keen on the [EC] social
charter").
101 EC White Paper Implementation Report 1990, supra note 70, at % 6; see id. at 28, 34
("[the social dimension is fundamental to the internal market").
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control most other areas of policy on British soil. 102 While by necessity
Britain's position ultimately softened somewhat, Britain entered the
1990's still opposing virtually all issues not spelled out in the White Pa-
per program; this obstinacy toward the EC, in fact, ultimatley led to
Thatcher's resignation. 0 3 Britain's opposition to the more sweeping vi-
sion of European unity championed on the continent was never clearer
than when one of Thatcher's closest cabinet ministers derided the EC
unity movement, linking the 1992 program to Nazism. 04
In spite of Britain's battle against a "social Europe," in May 1989
the Commission was able to issue its first wide-ranging declaration in the
labor and social rights area, the "Community Charter of Fundamental
Social Rights."1 5 After two redrafts, the Council effectively adopted
this Charter - over Britain's objection 10 6 - at its December 1989 meet-
ing in Strasbourg, and the Commission fleshed it out, issuing a detailed
"Social Action Program." 107 Comprising one of the Brussels's first ma-
jor single market pronouncements unconnected to the White Paper's
three-barrier structure, the Charter and Social Action Program together
spell out a comprehensive EC platform on European worker rights pol-
icy. Not surprisingly, by United States standards this policy proves rela-
102 See supra note 92. On Britain's reluctant attitude toward EC social law, see Hepple & Byre,
EEC Labour Law in the United Kingdom - A New Approach, 18 INDUS. L.J. 129 (1989).
103 See supra note 92. Apart from its opposition to "social Europe," Margaret Thatcher's Britain
notably resisted the post-White Paper movement toward EC "economic" and "political" union. On
the political struggle underlying EC Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), see generally Note,
The ECU Prospects for a Monetary Union in the European Economic Community, 21 LAw & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 273 (1989); European Monetary Union, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 25, 1990, at 65; Bishop,
Honest Money for Europe, Wall St. J., July 25, 1990, at A12, col. 3; infra note 354. On Brussels's
"official" view supporting EMU, see White Paper Implementation Report 1990, supra note 70, at %
17. On EC "political" union, see supra note 55. On the link between Thatcher's intransigence to-
ward EC unity and her November 1990 resignation, see infra note 180.
104 In July 1990 Britain suffered a scandal when its trade and industry secretary Nicholas Ridley
accused the EC's proposals for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) of being "all a German
racket designed to take over the whole of Europe," claimed the EC Commission was "17 unelected
reject politicians with no accountability to anybody ... who are pandered to by a supine parlia-
ment," and denounced support for the EC's bid for sovereignty as tantamount to "giv[ing in] to
Adolf Hitler." Hudson, U.K. Secretary Ridley Draws Fire for Lambasting EC and West Germany,
Wall St. J., July 13, 1990, at A6, col. 5 (ellipsis in original). Ridley resigned on July 14, 1990. Nick
and His Mouth, THE ECONOMIST, July 14, 1990, at 61; Horwitz, British Assaults on Germany's
Character May Hurt Relations between the Nations, Wall St. J., July 16, 1990, at A7, col. 1.
105 COM (89) 248 final (May 30, 1989) (first draft of Charter, supra note 99).
106 The second redraft (COM (89) 471 final (October 2, 1989)) is the last redraft before the ver-
sion which the Council approved in Strasbourg, over Margaret Thatcher's objection (COM (89) 568
final (November 29, 1989)). See supra note 99. On the debate over the legal status of the Council's
non-unanimous adoption, see infra text accompanying notes 155-181. For a discussion of the three
drafts of the Charter, see Bercusson, supra note 99, at 624.
107 Social Action Program, supra note 99.
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tively employer-restrictive. 08
III. EC-LEvEL LABoR AND SOCIAL RIGHTS:
THE STATE OF THE LAW
With the Charter and Social Action Program effectively adopted,109
at the turn of the decade Brussels had begun to coalesce its various em-
ployment-related policies, focusing on how businesses would have to em-
ploy Europeans after 1992.110 The Social Action Program calls for 47
specific social-law "instruments" to be implemented by the end of 1992,
and the Commission began issuing drafts of these called-for documents
in June and July, 1990.111
While the 1990's seemed to open a new era of EC social rights, actu-
ally Brussels had been quietly laying groundwork for a "single labor mar-
ket" at least since 1986, when the Single European Act had made the
1992 program legal reality.11 2 After the Single European Act, those EC
institutions concerned with the new market's social side articulated vari-
ous visions of a "single market" for EC employment. Through their for-
mal statements, these EC institutions unanimously and consistently
called for a unified labor and social program, just like the one the Com-
108 See, eg., Longworth, supra note 92 (employers oppose Charter because of its "clauses that
would encourage unionization, give workers access to their companies' records or give them a voice
in company management as is common in Germany").
109 On the status of the EC's adoption of the Charter and the Social Action Program, see supra
note 106 and infra text accompanying notes 155-181.
110 The wide-ranging political developments in Eastern Europe of late 1989, however, seemed
momentarily to divert Brussels's attention from "social Europe," as Europeans became aware of
their own growing political clout. According to a January 1990 Spanish news editorial:
Europe is entering this new decade with greater confidence in its economy than is the U.S.
Those who predict a slow process of transformation [within the EC] ignore that Europe, as
united, has a real potential to blaze in Eastern Europe the same economic trail that the U.S.
forged in America during the last century, or that Southeast Asia forged in the last few years.
ABC (Madrid), Jan. 8, 1990 at 54, col. 1 (translation by this author).
111 The Commission-proposed directives issued in June and July, 1990 would set forth strict lim-
its on employers' use of overtime and night work, and would regulate rest periods. Proposal for a
Council Directive on Certain Employment Relationships with Regard to Working Conditions, COM
(90) 228 final [hereinafter Proposed Directive on Working Conditions] (August 13, 1990); Proposal
for a Council Directive on Certain Employment Relationships with Regard to Distortious of Com-
petition, COM (90) 228 final SYN 280 [hereinafter Proposed Directive on Limited-Term Contracts]
(August 13, 1990); Proposal for a Council Directive Supplementing the Measures to Encourage
Improvements in the Safety and Health at Work of Temporary Workers, COM (90) 228 final SYN
281 [hereinafter Proposed Directive on Part-Time and Temporary Employment] (August 13, 1990).
For discussions of these proposals, see 134 Lab. Re]. Rep. (BNA) 438 (Aug. 6, 1990); see also More
Rights for Workers, supra note 100; Europe's Social Insecurity, THE ECONOMIST, June 23, 1990, at
13; Brother We Just Missed the 1992 Balloon, supra note 100; EC's Working-Hour Proposal, Wall St.
J., July 26, 1990, at A12, col. 2. In September 1990 the Commission issued another draft directive,
on maternity leave, which called for a required minimum of 14 weeks leave. See infra note 255.
112 See infra notes 114-127 and accompanying text
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mission and Council ultimately set forth in 1989, via the Charter and
Social Action Program.11 These institutions' statements, the direct
predecessors to the Charter itself, form the context out of which the
1990's concept of "social Europe" arises.
A. EC Statements on Labor and Social Rights before the Charter
The first comprehensive post-Single European Act plan for an EC
labor and social rights agenda was a May 1987 communication from the
Commission on "Internal and External Adaptation of Firms in Relation
to Employment."'1 14 In this communication, the Commission diagnosed
the EC's labor and social problems, isolating unemployment as the major
concern facing European labor.1 I In an effort to relieve unemployment
by spreading around already-existing jobs, the Commission sought to
limit work days and work weeks, and to reform the practice of flexible
job scheduling.116 The Commission also sought to harmonize EC mini-
mum wage regulations and "collective dismissal" systems, and to limit
employers' freedom to hire workers under contracts other than for an
"unlimited" duration.' 17 The communication also supported the vener-
able European labor concept of "worker consultation and participation"
113 See infra text accompanying notes 114-181.
114 Internal and External Adaptation, supra note 34.
115 Throughout the 1970's and 1980's the chief goal of European labor and social policy had been
to reduce Europe's high unemployment. At the dawn of the 1990's, as "Europhoria" for the single
market swelled worldwide, EC unemployment began to subside, and Europeans actually predicted a
future employment shortage. See eg., Smith, supra note 63, at 245 (during 1980's, political value of
"the plight of the unemployed" declined in the EC, "free-market programs were seen to be more
effective, and [EC] voters began to back away from their socialist heritage"); Brother We Just Missed
the 1992 Balloon, supra note 100 (even EC union leaders are "[flinally convinced that the single
market will create more jobs"); How the Other Half Works, THE ECONOMIST, June 30, 1990, at 21,
22 ("Europe is running out of new young workers"). Horwitz & Forman, Immigrants to Europe
from the Third World Face Racial Animosity, Wall St. J., Aug. 14, 1990, at 1, col. 1 ("[w]ith Euro-
pean economies booming and fertility rates plummeting - Italy's is the world's lowest - the need
for immigrant labor [in the EC] has soared"). Yet the motive of reducing unemployment lived on
as a key policy driving EC social matters. See, eg., Carrington, Europe's Left Fears 1992 Will Cost
Jobs, Wall St. J., March 16, 1989, at A12, col. 1 ("unemployment strains coming around 1992 will be
a bi[g] problem"). The global recession which began in the last half of 1990 put the European
unemployment issue back at the forefront of EC policy. See, eg., Unemployment Rises in the EC,
Wall St. J., Oct. 11, 1990, at A10, col. 3 (August 1990 rise in EC "unemployment" led "EC Com-
mission Vice President Henning Christophersen to call for the speeding up of economic and mone-
tary union within the EC"). The recent unification of Germany poses another special EC
unemployment problem. See Germans Voice Unity Fears; Workers Rally while Leaders Plan, Cincin-
nati Enquirer, May 2, 1990, at A8, col. 1.
116 Internal and External Adaptation, supra note 34, at Part III. Ultimately, when in 1990 the
Commission issued its first proposed directives under the Social Action Program, they were in the
area of work time restrictions. See supra note 111.
117 Internal and External Adaptation, supra note 34, at Parts IV, V, VI.
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- the requirement that employers inform workers about employment-
related issues and grant worker representatives a voice in
management.1 1 8
Shortly after this communication issued, the EC's Section for Social,
Family, Educational and Cultural Affairs released an "Information Re-
port on the Social Aspects of the Internal Market."'1 9 After summariz-
ing the developments in the EC labor and social arena which had then
occurred, this report argued that the Treaty authorizes broad regulation
of labor and social issues.12 Decrying an "unfair distribution of wealth"
in the EC,12 1 the report recommended a single EC social security sys-
tem,122 a new division of labor offering "equal job opportunities and...
shorter working hours," 123 and a comprehensive system of worker par-
ticipation. 4 To coordinate these, the report recommended an overall
"harmonization of working conditions in the various regions of the Com-
munity," with which "multinationals" - such as United States-based
employers of Europeans - would have to comply.125 The report con-
cluded that, in order to protect "fundamental social rights," Brussels
would have to "adjust national regulations to the new economic and so-
cial dimension which is to be generated by the reshaped Community-
wide single market."12 6 To create this new "dimension," the report of-
fered a list of specific worker rights meant to form the core of the EC's
ultimate social and labor program. 127
In November 1987, the EC's Economic and Social Committee - a
Treaty-created body charged with advising on social issues 2- released
118 Id. at Part II. On worker consultation and participation, see infra at text accompanying notes
257-283.
119 Section for Social, Family, Educational, and Cultural Affairs 1987 Report, supra note 18.
120 Id. On the debate over how the Treaty's "qualified majority" voting might apply to labor and
social issues, see infra text accompanying notes 155-181.
121 Section for Social, Family, Educational, and Cultural Affairs 1987 Report, supra note 18, at
§ 2.3.2.
122 Id. at §§ 2.3.4, 5.2.4.
123 Id. at § 2.3.8.
124 Id. at § 5.2.4.
125 Id. at §§ 2.1.4, 3.2.
126 Id. at § 4.6.4.
127 Id. at § 5.2.4.
128 Treaty, supra note 45, at art. 193 ("[a]n Economic and Social Committee is hereby estab-
lished"); see id. at arts. 194-98 (delineating role of this committee). Its name notwithstanding, the
Economic and Social Committee is an employment-related institution with a mission more "social"
than "economic." See generally COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, DIRECTORATE-
GENERAL FOR EMPLOYMENT, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, SOCIAL EUROPE 1/
90 (1990) [hereinafter SOCIAL EUROPE 1/90], at 78 (chart depicting position of Economic and Social
Committee among other EC institutions).
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an "Opinion on the Social Aspects of the Internal Market."'12 9 Like its
predecessor documents, this opinion called for "guarantee[s of] basic so-
cial rights immune to competitive pressures"; a1 3 the opinion even made
the openly-socialist recommendation that EC "supply and demand poli-
cies" be supplemented by "other measures."1 31 Specifically, the opinion
recommended shorter work hours, stronger collective bargaining ar-
rangements, tighter workplace health and safety regulations, more com-
prehensive social security benefits, and stricter controls on employment
contracts for other than fixed terms.132 The opinion, like its predeces-
sors, supported worker consultation and participation.
133
In a later document, the "Opinion on Social Developments in the
Community in 1987,"'' 1 the Economic and Social Committee proposed a
broad "people's Europe" of guaranteed "citizens' rights," at the direct
expense of free market policy: "Although more wealth is being pro-
duced, traditional forms of poverty are reappearing, flanked by growing
inequalities in economic, civil, social and cultural conditions and oppor-
tunities., 135 To remedy such "inequalities," and to create its called-for
"people's Europe," the opinion proposed a concrete list of suggested so-
cial rights.
136
In early 1988, the Commission re-entered the social arena by again
supporting a social side to the 1992 program, this time via a comprehen-
sive "working paper" addressing the "Social Dimension of the Internal
Market."1 37 In form, this document purported to be a "White Paper"
for "social Europe. ' 138 Elevating the call for labor policy reform to an
emotional level, this working paper threatened that, left unregulated, the
EC unemployment problem might "ultimately" give rise to "certain
forms of violence and criminal behavior, [and] other pathological social
behavior."' 1 9 To avert this fate, the working paper offered a single sug-
gestion: "a fair shareout of the advantages deriving from the Single Mar-
129 Opinion on the Social Aspects of the Internal Market (European Social Area), 87/C 356/08
(November 19, 1987).
130 Id. at § 1.6.
131 Id. at § 2.4.1.
132 Id. at §§ 1.5, 2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2.
133 Id. at § 2.1.
134 Opinion on Social Developments in the Community in 1987; 88/C 208/12 (June 2, 1988).
135 Id. at § 1.10; see §§ 3 ("people's Europe"), 3.3.3 ("citizen's rights").
136 Id. at § 3.4.
137 Social Dimension Working Paper, supra note 27.
138 Compare supra note 137 with White Paper, supra note 64. Paralleling the White Paper's
structure of physical, technical, and fiscal bariers, the Social Dimension Working Paper, supra note
27, at Part 65, calls for free movement, comprehensive labor laws encouraging "mobility," and re-
duced social costs.
139 Social Dimension Working Paper, supra note 27, at Part 12.
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ket."'1  According to the working paper, the single market "would be
pointless if the standard of living and of social protection attained by the
average European were called into question."
14 1
Invoking a postulate basic to the single market program as a
whole-that "homogeneity is always preferable to diversity"14 2 ---in an
annex paralleling the White Paper's list of 300 trade-related topics, this
working paper listed 80 social problems needing legislative resolution. 143
The annex list proposed, for example, a regulatory system for workplace
health and safety,"4 a system of information for workers,14 5 and controls
on "the proliferation of types of work contract."'" Further tracking the
White Paper's three-barrier organization, the working paper divided its
proposed agenda into three categories: freedom of movement, encour-
agement of intra-European labor mobility, and social facilitation of
workers into the integrated single market. 4 7
Joining the other EC institutions' calls for broad regulation of the
post-1992 European workplace, throughout the post-single European
Act period the EC Parliament championed social rights. The Parliament
issued a series of resolutions on social issues, including a comprehensive
"Resolution on Economic and Social Cohesion in the Community" and a
"Resolution on the Social Dimension of the Internal Market."' 148 Paral-
leling the other institutions' documents, the "Social Dimension of the
Internal Market" resolution proposed a comprehensive social platform
via a proposed list of "fundamental social rights," and suggested a set of
"minimum rules" to regulate specific labor-related areas. 149 And the
"Social Dimension of the Internal Market" stressed that EC social rights
140 Id. at Foreward.
141 Id.
142 Id. at Part 45.
143 Id. at Annex II. In form, this annex is a precursor to the Social Action Program's list of 47
"new initiatives" for instruments needed to create a "social Europe." See infra notes 161-165 and
accompanying text.
144 Social Dimension Working Paper, supra note 27, at Annex Part IV.
145 Id. at Annex Parts I, IV.
146 Id. at Annex Part I.
147 Id. at Part 65. In addition to this working paper, in 1988 the Commission issued a compre-
hensive set of proposals in the social sector outside of the employment arena. Proposal for a Council
Decision Establishing a Medium-Term Community Action Programme to Foster the Economic and
Social Integration of the Least Privileged Groups, COM (88) 826 final (December 22, 1988).
148 Doc. A2-307/80 (Economic and Social Cohesion in the Community); Doc. A2-399/88 (Social
Dimension of the Internal Market). The Parliament's 18 principal social resolutions are reprinted in
part in SOCIAL EUROPE 1/90, supra note 128, at 109-120. On September 13, 1990 the Parliament
approved a series of 100 legislative measures aimed at broadening the Social Action Program's
scope; however, the Commission and the Council were not expected to ratify this ambitious package.
149 Resolution on the Social Dimension of the Internal Market, supra note 148, at §§ 20, 55.
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must cover "workers from third countries" employed in the EC.
150
Taken together, the communication, the report, the opinions, the
working paper, and the resolutions add up to a cohesive agenda for a
single EC labor market. With this agenda extant by November 1988, the
Commission's President Jacques Delors acknowledged the need for a la-
bor "bill of rights" backed by the EC's full weight, so Delors asked the
EC Economic and Social Committee to draft a "Community Charter of
Basic Social Rights." '151 In February 1989 this Committee issued an
"Opinion on Basic Community Social Rights";152 like the Committee's
prior opinions, this document listed basic rights considered necessary to
ensure a "people's Europe." 153 Nestled among its exhortations for a
comprehensive EC-wide social policy, the opinion contained a discussion
of a key unresolved conflict basic to the "social Europe" debate, called
the "subsidiarity" question: whether, out of respect for national differ-
ences in labor policy and the member states' rights to self-government,
EC social rights should be enforced at the member state level - or
whether, because of the EC's need to adopt community-wide "common
rules," the EC should directly administer its own social agenda.154
150 Id. at 52 (Parliament "[clas on the Commission and the Council to formulate a joint policy
on the basis of reciprocity in respect of permanently established workers and their families from
third countries").
151 Letter from Jacques Delors and Manuel Manin to Chairman of the Economic and Social
Committee (November 9, 1988), reprinted in SOCIAL EUROPE 1/90, supra note 128, at 80.
152 Opinion on Basic Community Social Rights, CES 270 (89) (February 22, 1989). For back-
ground on the Committee's debate giving rise to this Opinion, see Record of the Proceedings of the
Economic and Social Committee on Basic Community Social Rights, 263rd Plenary Session Held at
Committee Headquarters, Brussels, on 22 and 23 February 1989, CES 292/89 Att/vh (March 7,
1989).
153 Opinion on Basic Community Social Rights, supra note 152, at Part III. This Opinion's Ap-
pendix provides a useful bibliography of EC institutions' prior statements on EC social rights.
154 Id. at Part 11(8) ("[allthough the Committee does not feel that all areas of social policy have
to be regulated by Community Legislation, it stresses the need to adopt basic social rights founded
on a common heritage of experience, taking due account of national differences"). "Subsidiarity"
has been more succinctly defined as the doctrine "that national or even local governments should
make policy whenever possible" (Europe's Social Insecurity, supra note Ill); that is, the doctrine
"that decisions should be taken at the lowest practical level" (European Monetary Union, supra note
103). According to the preamble of the Charter itself, "by virtue of the principle of subsidiarity,
responsibility for ... social rights lies with the Member States ... and, within the limits of its
powers, with the European Community." Charter, supra note 86, at preamble 16.
The impact of the "subsidiarity" question within the EC has grown from a jurisdictional techni-
cality into the central issue underlying the "social Europe" debate. Compare Schnorr, supra note 90,
at 69 (notation written in 1982 stating that EC has limited power in social arena, where member
states wield chief control) with Social Action Program, supra note 99, at 4 (key issue in achieving a
social Europe is "the principle of subsidiarity, whereby the Community acts [only] when the set
objectives can be reached more effectively at its level than at that of the Member States.. ."). The
Charter itself endorses the subsidiarity principle, declaring "[lt is more particularly the responsibil-
ity of the Member States, in accordance with national practices ... to guarantee the fundamental
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B. The Charter, the Social Action Program, and Their Legal Status
With the Economic and Social Committee's 1989 opinion in hand,
the Council was at last prepared to delimit precisely what rights the EC
should guarantee Europe's workers. At the Council's request, in early
1989 the Commission prepared a draft "Community Charter of Funda-
mental Social Rights," '155 a bill of twelve guarantees to all EC workers:
free movement, fair pay, "improved" working conditions, social security,
collective bargaining, vocational training, equal treatment between men
and women, worker "consultation and participation" in management,
health and safety in the workplace, protection of children and adoles-
cents, protection of the "aged," and protection of the handicapped.
15 6
The initial version of the Charter contained rather broad grants of these
twelve worker rights, similar to the two prior Commission statements on
"social Europe," the Commission's 1987 "Communication" and the 1988
working paper. 15
7
At its May 1989 meeting in Brussels, the Council sought to approve
the Commission's draft Charter, if only as a precatory statement of EC
policy. But Margaret Thatcher objected. 58 In an effort to win Thatcher
over, the Commission revised the Charter during the following months
- substantially watering it down, from EC unionists' perspective, and
labelling it a mere "Solemn Declaration."' 15 9 But at a vote during the
Council's December 1989 meeting in Strasbourg, even the newly-tem-
pered "Solemn Declaration" could not sway Thatcher. The Council
therefore "approved" this version, but by a non-unanimous 11-to-1.1o
social rights guaranteed in this Charter..... Charter, supra note 99, at 27. See generally Hepple,
supra note 99, at 646-47 (overview of "subsidiarity" concept).
155 COM (89) 248 final (May 30, 1989). For a discussion of the Charter's subsequent drafts, see
supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
156 COM (89) 248 final (May 30, 1989). These are the same rights set out in the ultimate version
of the Charter, supra note 99.
157 Compare COM (89) 248 final (May 30, 1989) with Internal and External Adaptation, supra
note 34, and Social Dimension Working Paper, supra note 27.
158 See We Europeans, The Times (London), May 18, 1989, at 11, col. 1 (notwithstanding
Thatcher's opposition to the May 1989 Charter draft, Britain should play the "'good' European"
and accept the Charter, "concentrat[ing] its fire against excessive harmonization, and on containing
the ambitions implied in the 'Social Charter' "). See generally McEvoy, The Social Side of "Europe
1992," EUROPE, Sept. 1989, at 26 (reporting on May 1989 Charter proposal and Thatcher's opposi-
tion to it).
159 See supra notes 105-106 (discussing progressive "watering down" of Charter over its several
drafts); see also COM (89) 471 final (October 2, 1989) (October 1989 draft of Charter). Some ex-
treme unionists ultimately came to oppose the Charter, viewing it as a toothless document which
might instill a false sense of security in the EC labor sector. E.g., Vogel-Polsky, What Future Is
Therefor a Social Europe following the Strasbourg Summit? 19 INDUs. L.J. 65, 66-67 (1990). On the
ambiguity surrounding the "Solemn Declaration" designation, see id. at 65-66.
160 See supra note 99; see also McEvoy, supra note 158.
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Between the May and December Council meetings, the Commission
had not only tempered the Charter, it had also made real progress on a
concrete legislative agenda to implement the Charter's twelve rights. 16
Just before the December Council meeting, on November 29, 1989, the
Commission presented a full-blown social program explicating the Char-
ter's otherwise-vague listing of worker rights. The new program bore the
ponderous title "Communication from the Commission Concerning its
Action Programme Relating to the Implementation of Basic Social
Rights for Workers," known for short as the "Social Action Pro-
gram." 162 Effectively paralleling the White Paper's annex 163 and similar
in form to the Commission's 1988 "working paper" on the EC's social
dimension, 164 the landmark 53-page Social Action Program document
calls for precise EC social regulation via 47 specifically-designated "in-
struments," 165 all grouped under the Charter's 12 social law rights.
Because the Commission had promulgated its Social Action Pro-
gram just before the Council "passed" the Charter, ever since the De-
cember 1989 Strasbourg Council meeting EC worker rights supporters
have pointed to the Social Action Program as their blueprint for a "social
Europe" under the Charter. 166 These EC social law mavens - including
labor unions, socialists, and certain key members of Parliment 167 - take
the Strasbourg Council's 11-to- 1 vote as a ratification of both the Charter
and the Social Action Program. To these "social Europe" supporters,
the 1 -to-1 vote turned these documents' agenda into a legal fait accom-
161 Social Action Program, supra note 99. While the Social Action Program is explicit in its
proposals for specific instruments, critics complain that the document fails to cite sources of Treaty
law under which the proposed instruments are to be passed. E.g., Hepple, supra note 99, at 644-46;
Vogel-Polsky, supra note 159, at 70-72.
162 Id. The Social Action Program builds upon an earlier EC "Social Action Program," issued in
1974. See Social Action Program, supra note 99, at 7.
163 White Paper, supra note 64, at Annex.
164 Social Dimension Working Paper, supra note 27.
165 Social Action Program, supra note 99, at 23.
166 See McEvoy, supra note 158, at 28 (European Trade Union Confederation [ETUC] "warn[s]
that... it will withdraw from the consensus upon which the Single European Act is based" unless
Brussels commits to implementing Charter and its proposals); Brother, We Just Missed the 1992
Balloon, supra note 100 (EC unions strongly support Charter and proposals under it).
167 See Eberlie, The New Health and Safety Legislation of the European Community, 19 INDUS.
L.J. 81, 86 (1990) ("[t]he Parliament undoubtedly favours the extension of the 'social dimension' of
the internal market, and its socialist majority has [sought to] increase the duties to be placed on
employers"); Leonard, Left Stands to Gain in EC Parliamentary Elections, Wall St. J., June 14, 1989,
at Al5, col. 3 (while Parliament had "a right-of-center majority" after 1984 elections, trend in late
1980's was toward socialist majority); cf. Europe's Social Insecurity, supra note 111 ("[s]ocialists in
the European Parliament have been struggling to find some antidote to the rigours of the competitive
free-for-all that 1992 promises"). The EC Parliament's leading champion of worker rights, Mme.
Martine Buron, has clearly set out the socialists' position on "social Europe." Buron, Community
Charter of Basic Social Rights for Workers, SOCIAL EUROPE 1/90, supra note 128, at 14.
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pli which remained only to be implemented.
168
But because the Charter's "passage" was not unanimous, and be-
cause the EC treaties do not even provide for a "charter" as a form of
law, 169 ever since Thatcher cast her dissenting vote at the Strasbourg
Council meeting, the EC employers' lobby17° has argued that the social
law mavens are jumping to an improper legal conclusion. 171 To these
employers, the Charter, as a "Solemn Declaration," is just a legally-
meaningless precatory document; if it is not, it can only be a now-dead
proposal which Margaret Thatcher singlehandedly vetoed in a proper
Council vote.
172
The EC employers' analysis grows out of the Single European Act's
requirement for Council unanimity in labor matters. 173  The employers
reason that, because even the post-Single European Act Treaty requires
168 EC labor leaders and socialists aim to strengthen workers' rights at employers' expense. The
worker lobby warns that without strong EC-level protections, a unified market will encourage the
"social dumping" of higher-paid northern Europeans and the exploitation of Mediterranean work-
ers. E.g., Unified Europe, supra note 7 ("r[many [EC] employers have already begun moving to
southern countries such as Spain and Italy, where wages are low and unions are weaker"). The
worker lobby, claiming popular support in its bid for tight EC-level regulation in each of the Char-
ter's twelve areas, argues that until now the single market program has unfairly supported big busi-
ness, at workers' expense. The worker lobby looks toward the Council meetings on EC "political
union" and their aftermath (supra note 55) as an opportunity to increase the power of the European
Parliament - because, as compared to the Council and Commission, Parliament champions the
"social Europe" agenda (supra note 167 and accompanying text). See More Rights for Workers,
supra note 100 (discussing EC unions' political goals in a restructured EC).
169 See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text. The Treaty-authorized forms of EC law are
regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations, and opinions. Treaty, supra note 45, at art. 189.
Cf. Hepple, supra note 99, at 644-51 (discussing non-status of "charter" form); Vogel-Polsky, supra
note 159, at 67 (EC employer groups stress Treaty's unanimity requirement for social regulation).
170 The employer lobby, speaking through the Brussels-based Union des Confedirations de
l'Industrie et de Employeurs d'Europe [UNICE], argues that under the doctrine of "subsidiarity"
(supra note 154) the member states should retain jurisdiction over most labor law issues; Brussels has
enough to do ironing out wrinkles in the EC trade agenda. Employers stress that because the post-
1992 single market will increase competition, businesses should not also have to bear an additional
layer of restrictive regulation. Further, employers urge that the Charter has no legal effect: Quite
simply, the Communities' treaties do not empower any such legal mechanism as a "charter." Supra
notes 97, 169.
171 Employers accuse the Charter of being "a statement of principles without legal force." Chi-
cago Tribune, Dec. 9, 1989 at 4, col. 2; cf. Vogel-Polsky, supra note 159, at 67; supra notes 97, 169-
170.
172 This argument involves qualified versus unanimous Council voting, as discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 173-18 1. On the Treaty's underlying authorization for EC social regulation, see
Treaty, supra note 45, at Part Three, Title III (arts. 117-128); Hepple, supra note 99, at 644-51. See
generally McMahon & Murphy, supra note 53, at 490-92 (Treaty's authorization of EC labor regula-
tion); Harris, "Social Charter" The Legal Basis, 139 NEw L.J. 764 (1989) (Charter's authorization
in Treaty); Harris, Legal Rights of EEC Citizens, 138 Naw L.J. 43 (1988) (Treaty's authorization of
EC social rights regulation); Vogel-Polsky, supra note 159, at 70-72 (unanimity issue and legal basis
for Social Action Program).
173 Treaty, supra note 45, at art. 100a § 2.
Worker Rights in the EC
11:564(1991)
Council unanimity on labor matters,17 4 Thatcher's lone objection effec-
tively killed the Charter. In fact, under this analysis every Council mem-
ber remains free singlehandedly to veto almost any of the 47 instruments
which the Commission plans to promulgate under the Social Action
Program. 17
5
This employers' "unanimity" argument is simply a plain reading of
Single European Act article 18, incorporated as amended Treaty of
Rome article 100a. 176 This article carves out an exception to the Single
European Act's "qualified majority" voting innovation, and requires that
a unanimous Council approve "provisions... relating to the rights and
interests of employed persons."177 But, cryptically, this article allows
that a mere qualified majority may institute those labor or social "pro-
posals ... concerning health [and] safety. '178
How to interpret this article's health and safety "exception within
an exception" has, not surprisingly, become the threshold question un-
derlying the "social Europe" debate. To employers, virtually all the So-
cial Action Program's 47 points, as well as the Charter itself, involve
"the rights and interests of employed persons" generally: Any contrary
reading would render the article 100a "employed persons" exception
meaningless. Yet to the social lobby, the very concept of "social Europe"
necessarily involves worker "health and safety." '17 9 To the social lobby,
apparently, all or virtually all the twelve points in the Charter and Social
174 Id.
175 See Bartley, supra note 7 ("Article 100A [sic]... would seem to mean unanimous agreement
would be needed to mandate worker participation on company boards").
176 Treaty, supra note 45, at art. 100a §§ 2-3, incorporating Single European Act, supra note 82, at
art. 18 §§ 2-3.
177 Treaty, supra note 45, at art. 100a § 2. Casual readers of the Treaty interpret this exception
strictly, assuming that the entire area of EC "labor-management relations" is subject to regulation
only by a unanimous Council. See, eg., Schildhaus, supra note 47, at 552 (the Council's power to
enact "directives on the basis of decisions taken by a qualified majority" is subject to three topical
exceptions, one of which is "labor-management relations").
178 Treaty, supra note 45, at art. 100a § 3. Until any single specific proposed instrument comes
before the Council for a vote, this debate over Treaty authority remains merely titeoretical. When
the Commission ultimately proposes an instrument on worker participation under the Social Action
Program, a threshold question should be whether that proposal, which deals with "employed per-
sons," also involves "health [and] safety," thereby allowing for a mere "qualified majority" vote. See
citations supra at note 172. Although the Social Action Program expounds upon the 47 proposed
social instruments in some detail, it does not cite specific Treaty authority for each proposal. Of
course, ultimately the debate over Treaty authority might be obviated - if the Council rewrites the
entire Treaty, in its move toward "political union." See supra notes 55, 168.
179 How the social lobby equates "social Europe" with "health and safety" is unclear. Appar-
ently, the social lobby reasons a fortiori that anything involving workers' general welfare encourages
better worker health. Cf. Vogel-Polsky, supra note 159, at 70-72.
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Action Program fit under the health and safety "exception within an
exception."
Assuming Thatcher's successor, Prime Minister John Major, up-
holds Britain's record of intransigence on social issues, how the EC
should interpret article 100a will remain a critical question.180 In fact,
given that EC employers are aligned with the traditional British position
on this issue, the article 100a question could remain a hotly contested
issue until the Court of Justice settles it - unless the Council first re-
writes the entire Treaty itself.181
C. The Twelve Worker Rights the Charter and Social Action
Program Guarantee to EC Workers
Although EC employers argue compellingly that the Charter is le-
gally null, the Charter and the Social Action Program have nevertheless
taken on an independent importance within the EC, effectively tran-
scending the threshold debate over what Treaty authority underlies "so-
180 Revzin & Mapes, Thatcher's Influence Turns into Isolation, Wall St. J., Feb. 27, 1990, at A20,
col. 1. According to Britain's Lord Cockfield, a former EC Commissioner, "Mrs. Thatcher's EC
policies... are isolating her within her own party.. . .' [Britain] could have had the leadership of
Europe.. .... but.. threw it away. It's no good saying I1-to-I votes don't matter if you're right.
Numbers do matter in a democracy."' Id. Thatcher's isolation from the EC crescendoed in the fall
of 1990, just before her November 1990 resignation, when her longest-tenured cabinet minister, Sir
Goeffrey Howe, resigned on account of her anti-EC policies. On Thatcher's isolation from the EC
leading up to Howe's resignation, see Guilford, Italy Believes Britain Must Fall in Line or Quit EC,
The Times (London), Oct. 31, 1990, at 4, col. 1; Jones, Thatcher Ready to Stand and Fight on
Europe, The Daily Telegraph (London), Oct. 31, 1990, at 1, col. 1; Looch, Thatcher's Xenophobia "A
Liability," The Daily Telegraph (London), Oct. 31, 1990, at 14, col. 7; Oakley, Thatcher Rules out
Further Surrender to Europe, The Times (London), Oct. 31, 1990, at 1, col. 4; Weekes, Britain
Spurns EC Back Door Route to "Federal Europe," The Daily Telegraph (London), Oct. 31, 1990, at
14, col. 6. On the blow Howe's resignation delivered to Thatcher's isolationist EC policies, leading
directly to Thatcher's own resignation, see Hughes, Out Come the Knives" Margaret Thatcher is
Fighting for Her Political Life in the Tory Tumult Unleashed by Sir Geoffrey Howe's Resignation, The
Sunday Times (London), Nov. 4, 1990, § 1, at 11, col. I ("4-Page Special" report); A Crisis for
Thatcher, The Sunday Times (London), Nov. 4, 1990, § 3, at 7, col. 1; Johnston & Jones, Howe Quits
over European Policy, The Daily Telegraph (London), Nov. 2, 1990, at 1, col. 1; Oakley & Webster,
Howe Resigns in Protest over Europe, The Times (London), Nov. 2, 1990, at 1, col. 1; Stephens and
Smith, Howe Quits in Row with PM over Europe, The Financial Times (London), Nov. 2, 1990, at 1,
col. 1. On the direct link between Thatcher's intransigent stance toward the EC and her November
1990 resignation, see Toman & Carrington, How Britain's Thatcher Got In Serious Trouble With Her
Own Party, Wall St. J., Nov. 21, 1990, at 1, col. 6.
181 On how hotly the the Article 100a Charter unanimity issue was debated at the end of 1990,
see EC's Labor Law Problems, Wail St. J., Nov. 27, 1990, at A19, col. 6 (the "dispute ... over
whether the [Social Action Program] proposals need unanimous backing to become law ...
threaten[s] to unravel the EC's 'social action program' "). On the Council's proposal to rewrite the
Treaty, see supra notes 55 and 168.
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cial Europe."1 2  Immediately after the Charter "passed," the
Commission began to work on draft directives implementing the Social
Action Program. In June and July 1990, the Commission issued its first
such proposals, which were in the areas of part-time and overtime la-
bor.1"3 Thus, in the months after the Strasbourg Council meeting, the
Brussels "Eurocracy" effectively validated the Charter and Social Action
Program, treating the documents as an active agenda for post-1992 "so-
cial Europe." The documents also seem quickly to have taken root at the
local level, inspiring Europeans with notions of new employment-related
rights.
Unfortunately for Britain and the EC employers, this trend
steamrolled the threshold argument that the Charter has no legal status;
the Social Action Program quickly took "on a political importance all its
own."18 4 Thus, the locus of the debate over "social Europe" shifted from
the legal status of the Charter to the still-nascent Commission-proposed
instruments under the Social Action Program. Try as Britain and the
employers might to stop it, this debate evolved into a fight over the pro-
priety and the content of each specific Social Action Program
proposal.185
In this fight, the EC social mavens urged the Commission to pro-
pose broad instruments guaranteeing sweeping worker rights which
would only technically cover "health [and] safety" - and which would
therefore enjoy a chance at qualified majority Council approval.1 8 6 The
182 See, e.g., supra note 111 (on Commission's June and July 1990 Social Action Program propos-
als on work time).
183 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
184 Vogel-Polsky, supra note 159, at 77. On the widespread acceptance of the Charter's rights
among Europeans generally, see id. at 67, n.4 (study finds 70% of Europeans support concept of EC-
level social regulation). See generally supra notes 169-179 and accompanying text.
185 The EC employers' leading spokesman, Zygmunt Tyszkiewicz, secretary general of the Union
des Conf&lrations de l'Industrie et des Employeurs d'Europe [UNICE], forcefully denounces those
Social Action Program proposals most restrictive of employers. See, e.g., More Rights for Workers,
supra note 100, at 60 (Tyszkiewicz opposes proposed ban on overtime work beyond eight hours per
day); Brother, We Just Missed the 1992 Balloon, supra note 100, at 62 (Tyszkiewicz argues against
supposed efficacy of EC-wide collective bargaining proposals); Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 94, at A-'
4 (Tyszkiewicz argues single market program could hurt employers). British industry also takes a
strong stance against the Social Action Program. See, e.g., Gribben, EC Reforms "Will Cost Firms
£3bn," The Daily Telegraph (London), Oct. 31, 1990, at 9, col. I (Confederation of British Industry
complains Social Action Program proposals on part-time and temporary work, overtime, and mater-
nity will be prohibitively expensive to EC employers). On the Thatcher administration's opposition
to the Social Action Program, see Bassett, Howard Gives Strong Warning of EC Jobs Impact, The
Times (London), October 31, 1990, at 6, col. 2 (Britain's Employment Secretary Michael Howard
denounces Social Action Program).
186 The Social Action Program conspicuously neglects to cite sources of Treaty authority for each
called-for instrument. See supra notes 161, 172, 178.
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employer lobby, of course, tried to keep alive its argument that the Coun-
cil could pass most social measures only by a unanimous vote - but to
be safe the employers also addressed the 47 Social Action Program-pro-
posed instruments, directly opposing those which could wreak real eco-
nomic trouble, 187 and invoking the "subsidiarity" doctrine in a bid to
temper most of the rest.
188
Thus, by mid-1990 the "social Europe" argument had come full cir-
cle, and returned to the question that EC social bodies debated since the
time of the Single European Act: What social rights should protect EC
workers in the post-1992 workplace? 8 9 While the pre-Charter analyses
of this question had invoked amorphous lists of rights, °90 this time the
debate centered on the Social Action Program's 47 specific proposals, all
organized under the Charter's 12 now-settled rights. By 1990, then, both
sides of the "social Europe" issue had to address the twelve-point rhetor-
ical framework which would order EC-level labor and social regulation
after 1992.
1. Right to Free Movement
The first of the Charter's twelve rights, and therefore the first part of
the "social Europe" framework, is the right to free movement - a right
which would ensure free emigration among all EC member states, "en-
abl[ing] any worker to engage in any occupation or profession in the
Community in accordance with the principles of equal treatment as re-
gards access to employment, working conditions and social protection in
the host country." 191 As the Social Action Program acknowledges, regu-
lations under the White Paper itself, when implemented, will ensure sub-
stantial freedom for cross-border employment and cross-border social
security rights. 192 The next stage of EC free movement regulation wil
187 See supra notes 97, 185. While EC unionists argue that "social Europe" is a needed counter-
weight to the boon to business which the single market will bring, employers urge that, to the con-
trary, the breakdown in protectionist barriers will hurt established EC business. See CLIFFORD
CHANCE, supra note 2, at 78 ("Ithat 1992 will be beneficial to business is not a foregone conclu-
sion,]" insofar as the single market will create a "downward pressure on prices"). According to
employers, additional burdens from restrictive social legislation could be crippling. E.g., supra note
97.
188 See supra note 154.
189 Compare supra notes 112-127 and accompanying text with supra notes 182-187 and accompa-
nying text.
190 See supra § III(A).
191 Charter, supra note 100, at % 2. Curiously, although freedom of movement is the Charter's
first right, the Social Action Program misplaces it as the fourth right, and the Social Action Program
also reshuffles some of the other rights. This section of this article follows the ordering of rights in
the Charter, not the Social Action Program.
192 Social Action Program, supra note 99, at 21. The Treaty itself calls for free movement of
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center on fine points, such as work subcontracting, public procurement
contracts, and supplemental social security benefits.193
The problem which the right to free movement addresses - restric-
tions on free movement among the states - is probably the greatest dif-
ference between interstate business in Europe and the United States19 4
In the United States, of course, the Constitutional "right to travel" and
comprehensive federal regulation facilitating interstate commerce so
thoroughly guarantee free movement that the "right" to transport labor,
goods, and most services among the states goes unquestioned. 195 Yet un-
til recently, Europe's national borders seriously impeded a corresponding
mobility in the EC, greatly increasing transaction costs among the mem-
ber states. 196 As proponents of the single EC market are keenly aware,
workers and purports to abolish employment discrimination on nationality grounds. Treaty, supra
note 45, at art. 48 §§ 1-2. On the free movement right in the EC generally, see Morris, Fredman &
Hayes, Free Movement and the Public Sector, 19 INDUS. L.J. 20, 21-22 (1990). For citations to the
chief pre-Charter instruments concerning freedom of movement for workers and mutual recognition
of diplomas and certificates, see SOCIAL EUROPE SP. ED., supra note 93, at Annex 1, Annex 2; see
generally id. at §§ 1.2.1, 1.2.2. On nationality discrimination prohibitions under EC law, see infra
note 196.
193 Social Action Program, supra note 99, at 23-25.
194 The Charter's goal of free movement aims at a "right" long enjoyed in the U.S. As such, the
EC concept of free movement is more analogous to U.S. interstate commerce protections than it is to
immigration law, which addresses the entrance of citizens of foreign states. The EC, of course, has
wholly separate problems and policies regarding immigration into the Community from countries
outside the member states. Eg., Huddled Masses on the Move, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 1990, at
51; see Melloan, Can Europe Keep Them down on the Maghreb?, Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1990, at A17,
col. 3. On the EC's immigration policy vis-a-vis non-member countries, see SOCIAL EUROPE SP.
ED., supra note 93, at § 1.2.5. On the problem of workers from non-member countries in the EC, see
id. at § 1.1.4.
195 See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa, 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974) ("[t]he right of interstate travel
has repeatedly been recognized as a basic constitutional freedom").
196 For discussions of the various social problems resulting from the difficulties arising out of
Europe's internal borders, see, e.g., 2 COLLINS, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: THE SOCIAL POL-
ICY OF THE FIRST PHASE 99-127 (1975) (mobility problems which Europe's "Working Population"
encounters); LAGUETrE & LATHAM, supra note 2, at 237-67 (freedom of movement of EC lawyers);
SUNDBERG-WHITMAN, DISCRIMINATION ON THE GROUNDS OF NATIONALITY: FREE MOVEMENT
OF WORKERS AND FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT UNDER THE EEC TREATY 127, 131-34, 148-68
(1977) (effects of Treaty article 48 on free worker movement); Haxburg, 1992 and Professionals'
Freedom of Establishment, 133 SOLIC. J. 712 (1989) (freedom of movement of English lawyers).
Schnorr, supra note 90, at 75-77 distinguishes the "free movement issue of employment discrimina-
tion against other member states' nationals" from EC anti-discrimination provisions, which gener-
ally involve sex discrimination. EC policy, both before and under the Charter, contains no cohesive
set of principles banning race discrimination; the closest the Charter comes to protecting race or
nationality is the "nationality discrimination" component of the free movement right. Cf. infra
notes 238, 342. While the U.S. inarguably has a greater historical problem with race discrimination
in employment than does Europe, recent immigration into the EC seems to be causing social
problems which might one day lead to EC-level protection for racial groups. See, eg., Horwitz &
Waxman, supra note 115 (in 1990 "Europe's racial problems were getting ugly"); Waxman, Anti-
Semitic Act Unifies Town, Chicago Trib., May 14, 1990 at 3, col. I (French Jew compares 1990
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only truly free movement among the member states could give the EC
the degree of internal market mobility long enjoyed in the United
States
197
True mobility among the member states means more than relaxed
customs procedures; it means free movement of people. Free movement
of people among the member states is so basic to the single market con-
cept that the free movement right is one of the very few labor-related
areas which the EC began to develop early. 198 Shortly after issuing the
White Paper, Brussels worked on standardizing recognition of occupa-
tional skills, professional degrees, and professional certifications, all with
the goal of granting both tradesmen and professionals a freedom to emi-
grate and work in any member state. 99 Given the further advances
which the Social Action Program envisions,2"° the EC right to free move-
ment of people may ultimately surpass its United States "counterpart,"
at least as it regards professionals: if each EC member state readily rec-
ognizes education and qualifications earned in the other member states,
EC interstate professional cross-certification will be more streamlined
than it is in the United States201
2. Right to Fair Pay
The Charter's second right addresses minimum pay, assuring that
employment "shall be fairly remunerated" at a "decent standard of liv-
ing."202 Going beyond a straightforward guarantee of a minimum wage
such as that under the United States Fair Labor Standards Act [FLSA]
of 1938,203 this right would guarantee an "equitable reference wage" to
vandalism of Jewish cemetery to "the 1930's and Germany"). Member states' internal laws only
recently have begun addressing this issue. See, eg., Graves, Asian Constable Wins First Race Bias
Case against Police Force, The Daily Telegraph (London), Oct. 31, 1990, at 4, col. 1.
197 Free movement is a high priority in the EC: The Treaty itself contains non-discrimination
provisions protecting nationals of one member state in the others. See Treaty, supra note 45, at art.
221. See generally Morris, Fredman & Hayes, supra note 192, at 21-22.
198 See supra notes 192 and 197.
199 See EC White Paper Implementation Report 1990, supra note 70, at 55, 68-70.
200 See supra notes 192-193 and accompanying text.
201 After 1992, for many purposes "movement" among EC member states should be smoother
than corresponding interstate U.S. "movement." For example, while U.S. state bar associations still
separately regulate admission to legal practice, in the EC a lawyer licensed in any member state will
more freely be able to become licensed in the others. See e.g., LAGUETTE & LATHAM, supra note 2,
at 237-67; cf. Sontag, supra note 2, at 29 (U.S. and European lawyers react to proposed post-1992
breakup of barriers to legal practice among EC member states). Similarly, the EC will regulate
teaching, insurance, medicine, and other areas which in the U.S. fall under the jurisdiction of the
various states.
202 Charter, supra note 99, at 5. On the importance of a minimum "decent" wage in the EC
before the Charter, see FrTZGERALD, supra note 37, at 111-125 ("Trends in [EC] Wage Standards").
203 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
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workers not employed under indefinite length contracts, and for every
would-be worker, "public placement services free of charge."204 The
Social Action Program calls for an opinion guiding member states in es-
tablishing "a decent reference wage," and it proposes a directive on "em-
ployment relationships other than full time open-ended contracts."2 '
United States law, by comparison, contains guarantees of "prevail-
ing wages" only in the context of construction work on state-funded
jobs,2"3 and the United States has no analog for the Charter's guarantee
of free placement services. To this extent, the Charter's right to fair pay
exceeds corresponding "rights" under U.S. law. On a broader level,
though, the EC's proposal for "a decent reference wage" essentially par-
allels the United States FLSA, in that its chief aspect is a guarantee of
minimum pay to unskilled labor.2" 7 Any major difference between this
EC right and the FLSA would be, simply, the rate at which each sets
minimum pay.208
3. Right to Improved Working Conditions
In addition to regulating wages, the Charter seeks to control labor
"conditions" including "forms of employment other than open-ended
contracts, such as fixed-term contracts, part-time working, temporary
work and seasonal work. ' 20 9 Directives proposed in 1990 would require
employers to treat part-time and seasonal workers the same as full-time
indefinitely-employed workers in all matters of benefits,210 and would
prohibit employers from using fixed-term contracts for any employee to-
talling over 36 months.211 Another proposed right would effectively in-
elude a specific limit on weekly hours beyond which an employee could
204 Charter, supra note 99, at 5 (reference wage); 6 (placement services).
205 Social Action Program, supra note 99, at 14-16. The first proposed instruments under the
Social Action Program, issued in the summer of 1990, involved these issues - specifically, part time
and temporary work. See supra note 111.
206 For an example of an especially employer-restrictive prevailing wage statute, see, e.g., Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. Chap. 4115 (Anderson 1980 & Supp.).
207 Compare Social Action Program, supra note 99, at 14 with 29 U.S.C. § 206.
208 An examination of how the European Currency Unit (ECU) coordinates exchange rates
among the member states within the European Monitary System (EMS), thereby ensuring an
equivalent reference wage until a common EC currency comes into existence, exceeds the scope of
this article. Cf. Shildhaus, supra note 47, at 553-54. For an in-depth analysis of the ECU, see Note,
supra note 103, and see supra note 103.
209 Charter, supra note 99, at 7-8.
210 Proposed Directive on Working Conditions, supra note 111, at arts. 2-8; Proposed Directive
on Part-Time and Temporary Employment, supra note 111, at arts. 2-6.
211 Proposed Directive on Limited-Term Contracts, supra note 111, at art. 4, a. For discussions
of the "traditional unlimited [EC] employment contract" - which employers try to circumvent via
fixed-term contracts see supra note 34; see also supra § HI(A).
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not work, even at an overtime rate.212 This section of the Charter would
also guarantee an "annual paid leave" and a "weekly rest period" to all
EC workers, and it would regulate the effects of employer bankruptcies
and "collective redundancies," or layoffs. 13 Spelling this out, the first
proposed directives issued under the Social Action Program in 1990
called for tight regulation of work time, rest periods, holidays, night and
weekend work, and overtime.214 Additionally, the Social Action Pro-
gram sets out a highly controversial proposal for a worker identification
form to "serve as proof of an employment contract or relationship.12 15
Employers in the United States have long operated under legislation
controlling most of the working "conditions" which this Charter right
would control. For example, certain United States state laws regulate
rest periods and other aspects of workplace conditions,216 and the federal
FLSA controls overtime pay.2 17 A controversial recent United States
federal statute even requires that employers notify workers before mass
layoffs and plant closings.218
Yet the EC's regulation of working conditions under the Charter
could prove even more employer-restrictive than all this analogous
United States law. Given that Brussels sees limiting work time as a
method of spreading around existing jobs and thereby alleviating unem-
212 See supra note 111. Such provisions are rooted in the EC's goal of reducing employment by
spreading around existing work. See supra notes 114-118 and accompanying text.
213 Charter, supra note 99, at 7 ("collective redundancies" and "bankruptcies"); 8 ("paid
leave" and "rest periods").
214 Compare supra note 111 with Social Action Program, supra note 99, at 19. Most notably, the
1990 Proposed Directive on Working Conditions, supra note 111, would require employers to treat
part-time and temporary workers the same as full-time workers employed indefinitely, in matters of
vocational training, worker representation, benefits and social security, access to social services, and
recruitment into full-time indefinite-length positions. Id. at arts. 2-9.
215 Social Action Program, supra note 99, at 19. This proposal would require that the identifica-
tion form "define the nature of employment, stipulate the duration of the contract, indicate the
system of protection provided and contain a reference to the relevant law and/or collective agree-
ment." Id. Employers oppose this proposal because it uses the back door - a claimed need for a
cross-border worker identification document - to require that employers delineate workers' pur-
portedly-collectively-bargained rights, which may not in fact exist at all. Employers complain that
the proposal implicitly assumes all workers are subject to collective bargaining agreements, but often
many are not: while in some EC member states (such as Denmark and Belgium) 80% to 90% of the
work force is unionized, in others, such as France and Holland, fewer than 30% to 40% of workers
belong to unions. See Workers of the World Disunite, supra note 10 (chart showing union member-
ship as percentage of all non-agricultural employees in each EC member states over three time
periods).
216 See HUNT, THE LAW OF THE WORKPLACE: RIGHTS OF EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES 24-25
(1984).
217 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
218 Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2101 (effective February 4,
1989). This U.S. plant-closing legislation is similar to, and was inspired by, European law.
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ployment,219 the "right to improved working conditions" could prove to
be one of the Charter's most intrusive aspects.22° The Commission's first
proposals under the Social Action Program, issued in June and July
1990, do indeed seem employer-restrictive, rigidly insisting that part-time
and temporary workers be treated - for benefits, collective bargaining,
and other purposes - as if they were full-time and indefinitely-
employed. 221
4. Right to Social Protection
The Charter's next guarantee is a right to "social protection," mean-
ing "an adequate level of social security," and, for the unemployed, "suf-
ficient resources and social assistance. ' 222 As explicated in the Social
Action Program, this right would grant state-funded minimum suste-
nance to the jobless, effectively paralleling United States social security
and welfare programs. 223 The right might also guarantee minimum un-
employment compensation, based, as in the United States, on employer
contribution.224
The Charter's "social protection" right appears to be an attempt to
coordinate existing EC welfare systems in order to guarantee Europeans
a minimum sustenance-level benefit.225  As such, this right could ulti-
mately have wide-ranging administrative effects, but as proposed it
would not seem to envision any new direct employer cost.226 Neverthe-
219 See supra notes 18-19, 115-116, and accompanying text.
220 The Social Action Program's proposals and the draft directives under the Charter's right to
improved working conditions - including especially the proposed worker identification form - are
employer-restrictive. See supra notes 111 and 215; Social Action Program, supra note 99, at 18-20.
221 See supra notes 111, 210, 211, and 214.
222 Charter, supra note 99, at 110.
223 Social Action Program, supra note 99, at 27-28.
224 See Hunt, supra note 216, at 43-47.
225 Charter, supra note 99, at 10 (deferring to "arrangements applying in each country"). Ac-
cording to the Social Action Program, to facilitate free movement of people, objectives of member
states' social security systems must "converg[e]." Social Action Program, supra note 99, at 27. Yet
due to radical differences among the member states' social security systems, there can "be no ques-
tion of harmonizing the systems existing." Id. See, eg., SPANISH FOREIGN TRADE INSTITUTE,
supra note 14, at 28-32 (analyzing Spanish laws of "Social Security," including "Basic System,"
"Disability," "Old Age," "Unemployment," "Death and Survivorship," and "Family Benefits").
226 On how the EC coordinated member states' social security schemes before the single market
program, see COLLINS, supra note 196, at 129-142; COMPENDIUM OF COMMUNITY PRovisIoNs ON
SOCIAL SECURITY (2d ed. 1983 & Supp. 1985); FITZGERALD, supra note 37, at 127-49; HOLLOWAY,
SOCIAL POLICY HARMONISATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1981); Joint Economic Commit-
tee, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. Joint Committee, Economic Policies and Practices, Paper No. 7, European
Social Security Systems (1965); SHANKS, EUROPEAN SOCIAL POLICY, TODAY AND TOMORROW
(1977); WATSON, SOCIAL SECURITY LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1980); Note, supra
note 60; Boskey, Book Review, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 935 (1981) (reviewing HOLLOWAY,
supra).
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less, to employers fearing that the creation of a "social Europe" might
turn the EC into a giant welfare state, this right raises the specter of
minimum benefit levels "harmonized" at a rate so high as to provide a
disincentive to cheap labor.
5. Right to Collective Bargaining
The fifth section of the Charter would guarantee an EC right of col-
lective bargaining.227 As has been clear to United States employers since
the time of the Wagner Act,228 the extent to which a government protects
organized labor has a heavy impact on employment relationships.
229
United States experience under the National Labor Relations Act and its
ancillary federal statutes regulating collective bargaining230 shows that
union status often plays a key role in an enterprise's profitability.231
While the EC member states have a strong tradition of organized labor
representing workers collectively, some evidence shows that European
unionization may not be as expensive as its United States counterpart.232
Until the single market program, union issues in Europe were
chiefly matters independent to each member state.233 In an attempt to
raise collective bargaining to the status of EC law, the Single European
Act, the Charter, and the Social Action Program all actively encourage
bargaining at the "European level." 234 Yet because so far European col-
lective bargaining has taken place largely at the local level, little prece-
dent explicates what, practically, "European level" bargaining will
mean.
2 3 5
227 Charter, supra note 99, at 11-14.
228 Codified as 28 U.S.C. § 151 (originally enacted July 5, 1935).
229 On the interplay between EC member states' labor policies and the member states' widely
different unionization rates, see Workers of the World Disunite, supra note 10.
230 29 U.S.C. Ch. 7, §§ 141-187.
231 See supra note 229.
232 See supra note 229.
233 See, e.g., SPANISH FOREIGN TRADE INsTITUTE, supra note 14, at 17-27 (analysis of Spanish
law of "Collective Labor Relations"). However, some member states have national laws which at-
tempt to give extra-territorial force to certain collective bargaining agreements. For summaries of
and citations to these laws, see SOcIAL EUROPE SP. ED., supra note 93, at Annex 11.
The Single European Act amends the Treaty to encourage EC-level collective bargaining. Sin-
gle European Act, supra note 82, at art. 22, amending Treaty, supra note 45, at art. 118b ("The
Commission shall endeavour to develop the dialogue between management and labour at European
level which could, if the two sides consider it desirable, lead to relations based on agreement.").
234 Supra note 233; see Charter, supra note 99, at 1 12. The sole "new initiative" which the Social
Action Program offers under the collective bargaining right is a proposed communication on the
"role of social partners in collective bargaining," intended to promote "the development of collective
bargaining including collective agreements at European level with special reference to the settlement
of disputes." Social Action Program, supra note 99, at 30.
235 See Sciarra, Regulating European Unions: An Issue for 1992, 11 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 141 (1990)
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Initially, industry-wide collective bargaining arrangements under
the Charter most likely will appear in those industries which would more
directly benefit from cross-border coordination, such as transportation;
such arrangements would be reminiscent of Teamster multi-employer
agreements, which have been common throughout the United States
trucking industry for years.23 6 Otherwise, notwithstanding the Charter's
call for "European level" bargaining, the localized nature of the standard
EC employment situation may hold most collective bargaining relation-
ships to the local level, just as is the case today in so many sectors of
United States employment.
6. Right to Vocational Training
Because Brussels envisions a skilled work force staffing its post-1992
EC workplace, one section of the Charter attempts to improve skills by
creating a right to lifetime vocational training.237 In what seems to be an
attempt to keep the cost of vocational training off the EC's books, the
Charter encourages management and organized labor to establish joint
"continuing and permanent training systems," and it urges employers to
grant workers "leave for training purposes."23 The Social Action Pro-
gram's proposals, similarly, seek to offer workers - including even part-
time and temporary workers - comprehensive training programs at
what could well prove to be employers' cost.239 United States law, by
contrast, offers no analogous right to lifetime vocational training, per-
haps because historically United States policy assumed individuals' self-
reliance.2"4 However, the Charter's vocational training right loosely cor-
(Italian labor law professor explores some possible paths which future EC regulation of collective
bargaining might take).
236 On U.S. multi-employer collective bargaining agreements, see citations at Lande & Zerbe,
Reducing Unions' Monopoly Power: Costs and Benefits, 29 CORP. PRAC. COMMENTATOR 109, 111
n.7 (1987).
237 Charter, supra note 99, at 15. On the importance of vocational training in the EC before the
Charter, see EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF VOCATIONAL TRAINING [hereinafter
CEDEFOP], CONTINUING TRAINING AS A MEANS OF PREVENTING UNEMPLOYMENT (1984);
CEDEFOP, VOCATIONAL TRAINING IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY -
COMPARATIVE STUJDY (1980); CEDEFOP, YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT AND ALTERNANCE TRAIN-
ING IN THE EEC (1980); FITZGERALD, supra note 37, at 33-53; VOCATIONAL TRAINING IN THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (P.J.C. Perry ed. 1972).
238 Charter, supra note 99, at I 15. Additionally, the Charter prohibits "discrimination" in train-
ing programs "on grounds of nationality." Id.
239 Social Action Program, supra note 99, at 40-42. On part-time and temporary workers' access
rights to employers' vocational training programs, see Proposed Directive on Working Conditions,
supra note 11, at art. 2, % 1.
240 According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the "principles [in the U.S. Constitution Bill of Rights]
grew in soil which also produced a philosophy that the individual was the center of society, that his
liberty was attainable through mere absence of governmental restraints, and that government should
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responds to certain more recent United States institutions, such as the
federal program which provides for retraining workers in declining in-
dustries,241 and the requirement of many state bar associations that law-
yers pursue ongoing lifetime education.242
Unlike the United States, where the few legally-mandated job train-
ing programs are typically government funded,24 the thrust of the EC's
proposed training would put cost burdens on employers, and possibly
also on unions. 2 " While Brussels's emphasis on worker training may
indeed engender a more skilled work force, such a highly skilled labor
pool may not necessarily be worth the extra employer cost.245 Insofar as
higher skill levels will raise the cost of labor generally, the proposed EC
training right, if implemented, will likely work to the detriment of those
who employ menial labor.
Z Right to Equal Treatment Between Men and Women
As its seventh right, the Charter seeks to outlaw sex discrimination
in employment,24  a prohibition already quite familiar to employers in
the United States, as well as in the E.C. Federal statutes such as Title
VII,247 the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,2 48 and the Equal Pay Act249
- as well as analogous state laws250 - completely ban sex discrimina-
tion in United States employment. Similarly, sex discrimination is one
area of social law in which the EC has long played a role: at least since
be entrusted with few controls and only the mildest supervision over men's affairs." Board of Educa-
tion v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624, 639-40 (1943).
241 Job Training Partnership Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq., at §§ 1651-1662c.
242 Increasingly, U.S. state bar associations require minimum annual hours of "continuing legal
education." Usually state supreme courts issue these requirements as a precondition of lawyers'
maintaining their status as members of the bar. Eg., Supreme Court of Ohio, Rules for the Govern-
ment of the Bar, Rule X (to maintain active status, members of Ohio Bar must complete 24 hours of
approved legal education every two years).
243 See supra note 241.
244 See, eg., Proposed Directive on Working Conditions, supra note 111, at art. 2, 1 (employers
must give their part-time and temporary workers the same access to employer-provided vocational
training that full-time indefinitely-employed workers have).
245 Under a pure free market analysis, if this worker training were worth the extra cost, employ-
ers would pay for it voluntarily, and the EC would not have to mandate it. Of course, the counter-
argument is that because workers change jobs, employer-provided training may well be worth its
cost, but it must be legislated into mandatory existence, to prevent individual employers from taking
a "free ride."
246 Charter, supra note 99, at 17. Treaty, supra note 45, at art. 119 mandates "equal pay for
equal work."
247 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.
248 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
249 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
250 Generally, laws in the U.S. states prohibit sex discrimination in a manner paralleling federal
law. See 1 LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 2-292 - 2-321 (1990).
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the mid-1970's, Brussels has actively attempted to eradicate sex discrimi-
nation not only in hiring and retention decisions, but especially in equal
pay and equal benefits.2"' In certain prescribed circumstances, individual
EC workers have already taken their employers and their member states
to the Court of Justice for direct redress of sex-based discrimination
claims.25 2 "Equal pay" is one discrimination-law concept far more ad-
vanced in the EC and its member states than in the United States253
Encouraging even further development in this area, the Charter
would guarantee the "principle of equality" in "access to employment,
remuneration, working conditions, social protection, education, voca-
tional training, and career development."2 4 The Social Action Program
expands this, concentrating specifically on pregnancy, child care, and
maternity leave.255 In September 1990, in fact, the Commission issued its
third proposal under the Social Action Program, a specific directive re-
quiring a minimum of 14 weeks maternity leave.256 United States em-
ployers operating in the EC will therefore have to be especially vigilant,
251 According to the Social Action Program, pre-existing EC directives on "equal treatment rep-
resent a considerable step forward." Social Action Program, supra note 99, at 35. The Treaty itself
guarantees equal pay. Treaty, supra note 45, at art. 119. For citations to sources treating EC sex
discrimination principles, see Cook, Bibliography: The International Right to Nondiscrimination on
the Basis of Sex, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 161 (1989); see also How the Other Half Works, supra note 115.
See generally Argiros, Sex Equality in the Labour Market and the Community Legal Order: An
Attempt at an Appraisal, 12 LIVERPOOL L. REv. 161 (1989); Harvey, Equal Treatment of Men and
Women ii the Work Place: The Implementation of the European Community's Equal Treatment
Legislation in the Federal Republic of Germany, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 31 (1990); Millet, European
Community Law: Sex Equality and Retirement Age, 36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 616 (1987); Presentation
of the Third Comparative Labor Law Roundtable Unlawful Discrimination in Employment, 20 GA.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 105-44 (1990); Note, supra note 60; Belton, Book Review, 13 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 901 (1980).
252 E.g., Millet, supra note 251, and cases cited therein.
253 While activity under the U.S. Equal Pay Act (29 U.S.C. § 206(d)) is sparse, the EC Treaty's
equal pay right (Treaty, supra note 45, at art. 119) is quite well-developed. For explications of EC
equal pay law, see COLLINS, supra note 196, at 84-89; FrrZGERALD, supra note 37, at 66-68;
MCMAHON & MURPHY, supra note 53, at 492-509; SAUNDERS & MARSDEN, PAY INEQUALITIES IN
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1981); Covington, Equal Pay Acts: A Survey of Experience under
the British and American Statutes, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 649 (1988); Fitzpatrick, European
Women Entitled to Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value, 34 FED. B. NEWS & J. 384 (Nov. 1987);
Greaves, Article 119 and Its Interpretation by the European Court of Justice, 33 No. IRELAND
LEGAL Q. 199 (1982); and see generally Napier, Equal Value in the House of Lards - Third Time
Unlucky?, 139 NEw L.J. 36 (1989) (British law).
254 Charter, supra note 99, at 17.
255 Social Action Program, supra note 99, at 36-38 (proposing directive on workplace health
hazards facing pregnant women, recommendation on child care, and recommendation on job rights
for pregnant women and mothers). The Commission issued a draft of this directive - which would
require a minimum of 14 weeks employer-provided maternity leave - in September 1990. See Ma-
ternity Leave in EC, Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 1990, at A7, col. 4.
256 See supra note 255.
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ensuring their employment practices keep up with Brussels's emerging
regulations in the family care area.
8. Right to Worker Consultation and Participation in Management
Easily the Charter's most controversial proposal is its guarantee of
worker access to management information and worker participation in
corporate affairs affecting employment.257 While the "worker consulta-
tion and participation" concept is familiar to United States labor aca-
demics,25 it is foreign to United States employers - in fact, even United
States union leaders perceive management "participation" as outside
their scope of expertise.259 In the EC, on the other hand, certain member
states' national labor law systems have long ceded generous management
participation rights to labor.2"
The European worker consultation and participation concept in
these member states encompasses rights to worker information, consulta-
tion, and true "participation" in management decisions. Under the
member states' systems, labor representatives get advance notice of man-
agement's plans which would affect the workplace, then labor gets a
chance to consult and participate in those management affairs which ef-
fect employment - including corporate mergers, technological changes,
restructurings of operations, and "transfrontier" employment issues.261
For some time, Brussels has sought to harmonize these rights under
member states' laws, and extend them to workers in all member states.262
257 Charter, supra note 99, at 17-18 (approved draft of Charter contains two consecutive
paragraphs numbered "17").
258 A surprising number of U.S. scholarly studies of the worker participation concept exist, spec-
ulating on what role worker participation might play in U.S. labor relations. See, eg., Gould, Re-
flections on Workers' Participation, Influence, and Powersharing: The Future of Industrial Relations,
58 U. CIN. L. REv. 381 (1989); Harper, Reconciling Collective Bargaining with Employee Supervision
of Management, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1988); Perline & Poynter, The Effects of Worker Participation
Plans on Union Views of Managerial Prerogatives, 40 LAB. L.J. 37 (1989).
259 See Perline & Poynter, supra note 258, at 38-39 (poll finds most U.S. union leaders believe that
many aspects of management are most properly left outside scope of collective bargaining). But cf
White & Grenier-Guiles, GM's Plan for Saturn to Beat Small Imports Trails Original Goals, Wall St.
J., July 9, 1990, at 1, col. 6 (under labor relations practices at new U.S. General Motors "Saturn"
plants, workers "participate" somewhat in management).
260 For discussions of the different worker participation schemes existing in various member
states, see Schnorr, supra note 90, at 72-74; Note, supra note 37, at 982-87.
261 Supra note 260.
262 For discussions of Brussels's various worker participation proposals since the 1970's, see
BLANPAIN, BLANQUET, HERMAN & MouTY, THE VREDELING PROPOSAL: INFORMATION AND
CONSULTATION OF EMPLOYEES IN MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (1983); McMAHON & MUR-
PHY, supra note 53, at 515-17; Bisconti, Participation of Employees in the European Economic Com-
munity, 1987 Private Investors Abroad (MB) § 11-1 (1988); Hepple & Byre, supra note 102, at 138-
41; Schnorr, supra note 90, at 72-74; Note, supra note 37.
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Not surprisingly, employers have forcefully challenged the EC's forays
into the worker consultation and participation area, first in the context of
the "Vredeling Proposal, 2 63 and more recently under the proposed
"Fifth Directive" for a European company statute.2 "
Labor laws of the various member states structure worker consulta-
tion and participation in different ways, so Brussels's notion of worker
consultation and participation is theoretically a hybrid of the diverse
practices among these member states.26 5 However, the proposed EC
right of worker consultation and participation seems to be as employer-
restrictive as the worker participation right gets in any member state.266
This may be why European employers decry the EC's amalgamated vi-
sion of the consultation and participation schemes; management usually
argues that worker participation would be most appropriate, if at all,
only at the local, plant-by-plant level.2 67 Predictably, Europe's interna-
tional unions lobby the other way, urging a multinational-level participa-
tion which includes mandatory labor representation on corporate boards
- which, the unions claim, is the only effective way to ensure real
"participation. 2 68
263 Council Directive on Procedures for Informing and Consulting the Employees of Undertak-
ings with Complex Structures, in Particular Transnational Undertakings, 25 0. J. Eur. Comm. (No.
C 292) 33 (1982) [hereinafter Vredeling Proposal]. According to one source:
None of the proposals of the European Commission in the area of labour relations has aroused
more heated debate, tension, and continuous heavy lobbying, both in national capitals and at
the European Headquarters in Brussels and Strasbourg, as the proposed directive for informing
and consulting the employees of undertakings with complex structures, in particular transna-
tional undertakings, commonly known as the 'Vredeling Proposal' after Mr. Vredeling, the So-
cial Commissioner of the EEC at the time the draft was accepted by the Commission in
November 1980.
BLANPAIN, BLANQUET, HERMAN & MouTy, supra note 262, at 17.
264 Fifth Company Law Directive, 0. J. Eur. Com. (No. C. 240) 2 (1983) [hereinafter Fifth
Directive].
265 See supra note 262; see also Social Action Program, supra note 99, at 31 (discussing "diversity
[among] Member States in [the worker consultation and participation] area").
266 Compare Charter, supra note 99, at 17-18 with citations supra at note 262.
267 "[L]ogic [behind the EC's worker consultation and information or participation proposals
does] not appeal to many of Europe's bosses. John Lewis, a British retailer, fears it might have to
change its well-established workers' councils. Unilever's [head of industrial relations Herwig] Kress-
ler, who chairs an industrial relations working party for the European Round Table, an industrial-
ists' club, worries that if companies have to introduce a new EC layer of consultation on top of their
existing procedures the result would be extra cost and confusion." More Rights for Workers, supra
note 100. United States-based employers oppose worker consultation and participation even more
vehemently. Some United States businessmen simply cannot even comprehend the possibility of EC-
wide worker consultation. See, eg., Selz, supra note 40 (U.S. chairman of International Franchise
Association, Arthur Karp, calls Dutch consultation procedure "a socialistic concept" which Karp
reasons, a fortiori, will have to "change with [EC] unification" because "[c]ertainly not all of the
[EC] countries will agree to those kinds of restrictions").
268 See, eg., Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 94, at A-4 - A-5 (Fritz Rath, Confederal Secretary to
European Trade Union Confederation [ETUC] advocates mandatory EC-level worker consultation
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As originally envisioned under the EC's Vredeling Proposal and
Fifth Directive,26 9 EC-wide worker participation was to be a "rider" di-
rective accompanying a procedure for EC-wide corporate status. 270 The
theory here was that a single European corporate status is a real "bene-
fit," one which multinational European corporations have sought since at
least the late 1960's.271 Brussels proposed attaching to this benefit a
"burden": worker participation.272 In an ingenious mix of labor and
corporation law, this "rider" model ties worker participation to whatever
cross-Europe incorporation mechanism Brussels ultimately produces,
forcing those companies which opt for trans-European corporate status
to adopt the EC's worker participation provisions into their very articles
of incorporation.2 7 3
Yet the Charter and Social Action Program effectively reject the his-
toric link between EC worker participation and company law, leaving the
future of any such connection in the hands of those drafting the EC's
company law instruments. Instead, the Charter and Social Action Pro-
gram call for an unrestricted right of worker consultation and participa-
tion for employees of corporations operating in more than one member
state.274 To effect this, the Social Action Program proposes a single "in-
strument," of unspecified character, which would establish "equivalent
systems of worker participation in all European-scale enterprises.
275
and decries EC employers' "genera[l] hostil[ity]" toward the concept; Rath says that, "in the back
rooms," EC employers will admit they would support "some kind of information sharing... not out
of enlightenment, but... to avoid conflict").
269 Vredeling Proposal, supra note 263; Fifth Directive, supra note 264.
270 See CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 2, at 31-33.
271 See Note, supra note 37, at 31-33. See generally Carreau & Lee, Towards a European Com-
pany Law, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 501 (1989) (EC proposals for a single incorporation
mechanism).
272 See generally supra note 262. A single trans-European corporate status would be a real benefit
to multinational operations, reducing the paperwork and multiple tax liabilities still necessary for
maintaining a separate corporate status in each member state. As a step in the direction of an EC-
wide corporate status, Brussels now recognizes cross-border affiliations of business entities as "Euro-
pean Economic Interest Groupings" (EEIG's). Certain forms of European businesses, including law
firms, are rapidly forming EEIG's to create formal cross-border networks. Cf. Murphy, The Euro-
pean Economic Interest Group (EEIG): A New European Business Entity, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 65 (1990).
273 For a discussion of the historic link between EC company law proposals and worker consulta-
tion and participation, see SOCIAL EUROPE SP. ED., supra note 93, at § 2.2.1.3.
274 See Charter, supra note 99, at 117 (worker consultation and participation requirement "shall
apply especially in companies or groups of companies having establishments or companies in two or
more Member States of the European Community"). The Social Action Program leaves to the mem-
ber states the question of what worker consultation and participation obligations purely domestic
employers should have. Social Action Program, supra note 99, at 31-34.
275 Social Action Program, supra note 99, at 32-33. Separately, the Social Action Program pro-
poses another, analytically separate instrument under the worker participation right on "equity shar-
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Under this instrument, employer "enterprises" would have to provide
their workers with "general and periodic information" regarding those
aspects of company development which affect employment.276 Trans-Eu-
ropean employers would therefore have to consult with worker repre-
sentatives "before taking any decision liable to have serious consequences
for the interests of employees, in particular, closures, transfers, curtail-
ment of activities, substantial changes with regard to organization, work-
ing practices, production methods, long term cooperation and other
undertakings." '27 7
The Social Action Program would also require that any covered em-
ployer's "dominant associated undertakin[g]" - that is, its parent -
provide the employer with enough relevant information to comply with
Brussels' worker consultation and participation requirements.278  Be-
cause the Social Action Program contains no exception for "dominant
associated undertakings" based outside the EC, this proposal would ap-
parently impose an affirmative duty on United States corporations' state-
side headquarters to keep their European branches informed of any plans
which could possibly affect EC employment - giving European worker
representatives a chance to "consult" before United States headquarters
could fashion nascent ideas into faits accomplis.2 79 To the extent that
this aspect of the EC's proposed worker participation right violates the
international law doctrine of sovereignty, the United States State Depart-
ment will challenge it as invalid.28 0
For obvious reasons, worker consultation and participation is a vol-
atile and controversial aspect of "social Europe," especially from United
States-based corporations' viewpoint. Accordingly, employers of
ing and financial participation by workers," which aims to redistribute to certain workers "a share of
the enterprise's results." Id. at 34. The Social Action Program does not say whether the EC would
seek to enforce this "equity sharing" goal through anything other than non-binding encouragement.
276 Id. at 32-33.
277 Id. at 33.
278 Id.
279 The Labor Counselor to the United States State Department's Mission to the EC takes the
position that the United States will invoke the international law doctrine of sovereignty to challenge
any EC worker participation proposal which would have an internal effect inside the United States,
insofar as it could affect the makeup of a United States board of directors. Speech by Daniel Turn-
quist, United States State Department Labor Counselor, United States Mission to the EC, ABA
Committee on International Labor Law Midyear Meeting in Strasbourg, France (Apr. 27, 1990),
reported in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 94, at A-4, A-6 (May 15, 1990). However, a strong argu-
ment exists that an EC instrument echoing the Social Action Program's clause on "dominant associ-
ated undertakings" would not violate the sovereignty or extraterritoriality principles. Of course, any
debate remains premature until the EC issues specific instruments under the worker consultation and
participation right.
280 See supra note 279.
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Europeans continue to track the progress of this Charter right even more
closely than that of the other eleven.28 1 According to a rumor in mid-
1990, the Commission would release two 28 2 proposed "instruments" ex-
plicating worker consultation and participation; the Commission was to
offer a draft directive on worker consultation, but - apparently in a
bow to employer interests - only a draft regulation on worker
participation. 3
9. Right to Health and Safety Protection in the Workplace
Another area in which European worker representatives have long
called for comprehensive EC-level regulation is workplace health and
safety. Substantial progress has occurred in this area over the years.28 4
In a way paralleling United States administrative law under the Occupa-
tional Safety & Health Act [OSHA],2 s5 the Charter appears to impose a
"general duty" on employers to maintain a safe workplace,28 6 with the
goal of codifying the specifics of this duty through comprehensive work-
place safety regulation§, many of which already exist.2 87 Twelve of the
Social Action Program's 47 proposals involve workplace health and
281 See supra note 267.
282 The Social Action Program sets out just one proposed instrument explicating the worker par-
ticipation and consultation right. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
283 Speakers discussed this rumor at the ABA Committee on International Labor Law Midyear
Meeting in Paris and Strasbourg, France (Apr. 22-29, 1990), reported in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
94, at A-4 - A-5 (May 15, 1990) ("the European Commission will propose a directive covering
information and consultation and a recommendation covering participation. This would require EC
member countries to 'harmonize' their laws to conform to the information and consultation require-
ment, but it would leave the area of worker participation in management decision-making up to
individual countries' determination."). See More Rights for the Workers, supra note 100 ("a measure
due in November [1990] on the right of workers to consultation and information... will probably
require any EC company with subsidiaries in more than one country to set up a consultative council
at group level"). However, ultimately Brussels watered down even this compromise position: Social
Affairs Commissioner Vasso Papandreou prepared a proposal for a directive, presented in December
1990, which would require those companies employing more than 1,000 EC workers in two or more
member states to establish a "European Works Council" to consult with management at the EC
level. See Don't Forget to Tell the Workers, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 1, 1990, at 82. Unionists were
unhappy with this proposal, because the "Works Councils" would have no authority beyond mere
consultation; employers were unhappy with the proposal because, they argued, worker consultation
is most appropriate at the local level. Id. at 82, 84.
284 See Social Action Program, supra note 99, at 43 (noting that before Single European Act, EC
had made substantial inroads in certain areas of health and safety regulation); see also COLLINS,
supra note 196, at 90-98 (health and safety is appropriately regulated at EC level); FrrZGERALD,
supra note 37, at 87-110 (EC regulates "industrial health and safety").
285 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 etseq.
286 29 U.S.C. § 654 (so-called "OSHA General Duty Clause").
287 Compare Charter, supra note 99, at § 19 and Social Action Program, supra note 99, at 45-49
with 29 U.S.C. § 654.
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safety - more proposals than under any other single Charter right.
288
By their very specificity, these twelve proposals reflect that existing EC
safety regulations cover substantial ground. Subsequent regulations need
only fill in gaps: among these dozen proposals are calls for precise direc-
tives in the fishing, mining, and asbestos industries.28 9
How the proposed safety regulations would affect a specific EC em-
ployer's workplace, of course, controls how free the employer will be to
structure its operations efficiently. A chief concern for United States em-
ployers just starting up employment operations in Europe will be
whether the EC regulations translate efficiently from the company's es-
tablished OSHA-complying procedures. For employers already operat-
ing in Europe, the chief concern will be whether the ultimately-adopted
EC regulations radically change existing safety law now applicable in the
member states. How Brussels resolves these concerns, of course, will be
industry-specific.
10. Protection of Children and Adolescents
The Charter's final three rights grant affirmative "protections" to
three specific groups: the young, the old, and the handicapped.29 The
Charter's protections of the young, 29 1 which largely concern wage rates
and vocational training, would appear more inclusive than their closest
United States equivalents, laws governing minimum work age,292 child
labor regulations, 293 and the sub-minimum "training wage" for youth.
294
Citing a need to reduce high youth unemployment, the Charter
288 Compare Social Action Program, supra note 99, at 45-49 with id. at 9-42, 50-53.
289 Id. at 45-47. The Social Action Program's nine remaining health and safety proposals involve
maritime safety, safety at temporary work sites, drilling safety, industrial diseases, workplace safety
notifications, worker information regarding industrial diseases, exposure to physical hazards, trans-
portation safety, and coordinated regulation of hygiene and health. Id. at 45-49. The proposals
regarding workplace safety notifications and worker information regarding diseases parallel the re-
cent push under U.S. OSHA law for worker "right to know" protections. 29 C.F.R. § 191.0. For a
discussion of the advanced EC health and safety regulations at the time of the Charter and Social
Action Program, see Eberlie supra note 167.
290 Charter, supra note 99, at 20-26. By today's standards in the U.S., protection of age and
handicap seem an equitable extension of civil rights. Such protection, however, is not taken for
granted in Europe. As recently as 1977, one European commentator urged:
[I]f one concentrates one's attention completely on the so-called marginal groups, it may simply
be at the expense of adult males who are not normally in need of help. There is no particular
sense in that. Neither socially, economically nor politically is there much merit in boosting em-
ployment ofyouths, women or handicapped if it means proportionally fewer jobs for fully trained
fathers offamilies.
SHANKS, supra note 226, at 22-23 (emphasis added).
291 Charter, supra note 99, at 20-23.
292 U.S. federal law effectively prohibits minors under age 16 from working. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e)-
212.
293 U.S. federal law expressly prohibits "oppressive child labor." 29 U.S.C. § 212.
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seeks to set 15 as the EC's minimum employment age.2 95 And, for youth
lawfully employed, the Charter would require "equitable remunera-
tion."'2 9 6 The Social Action Program adds a call for a single directive
which would "approximat[e]" the member states' various child protec-
tion laws.2 97 And the Charter adds a wrinkle on which the Social Action
Program is silent, a requirement that "[flollowing the end of compulsory
education" the young receive "initial vocational training of a sufficient
duration to enable them to adapt to the requirements of their future
working life."29  Such training could easily become expensive for
employers.
1L Protection of the Aged
The Charter next grants affirmative rights to the aged, but these
rights focus on basic state-provided sustenance, not employment restric-
tions;2 99 the EC member states do not have a tradition prohibiting age
discrimination."° Ensuring that Europe retain the Western tradition
granting workers a viable pension, the Charter calls for a right to "suffi-
cient resources and to medical and social assistance" after a certain age,
regardless of former employment status. 30 1 By contrast, the United
States actively prohibits discriminating in employment against everyone
over age 40,302 and, as a branch of labor law, closely regulates employers'
benefit and pension programs.303
That the Charter's social protections for the aged appear to focus on
294 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1989, § 6, 103 Stat. 941 (1989) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
206 Note).
295 Charter, supra note 99, at % 20. Member states would be able to set their ages higher, based
on "the minimum school-leaving age." Id.
296 Id. at 1 21.
297 Social Action Program, supra note 99, at 50. In this context, the Social Action Program
appears to use "approximate" as a term of art meaning "harmonize at the EC level." To this extent,
"approximation" is the antithesis of the "subsidiarity" concept (see supra note 154), because "ap-
proximation" moves regulation up toward Brussels, rather than keeping it with the member states.
On the "supranational structure" of EC law, see Kennedy & Specht, supra note 47, at 436-41.
298 Charter, supra note 99, at 1 23.
299 Id. at 11 24-25. On protections for the aged in the EC before the Charter, see Millet, supra
note 251, at 616-17.
300 European employers, in fact, openly advertise age biases in a way which would be grossly
illegal in the U.S. E.g., Sunday Times (London), Nov. 4, 1990, § 6, at 2, col. 3 (advertisement placed
by Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte Executive Recruiting seeking "Sales and Marketing Director...
[p]robably aged around 35"); id. at 3, col. 1 (advertisement seeking "Internal Sales Manager...
[a]ged between 23-40"); id. at 10, col. 1 (advertisement seeking "Director of Legal Services" for
MSL International, aged "early-mid 30's").
301 Charter, supra note 99, at t 25.
302 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.
303 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq.
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state-run benefit programs actually benefits employers, insofar as it de-
flects the concerns which gave rise to the employer-restrictive United
States model of affirmative anti-discrimination rights for older workers.
On this point the Social Action Program is even less intrusive than the
Charter, because it emphasizes that under the "subsidiarity" doctrine"
member states should retain primary control over issues concerning the
aged.3" 5 As such, ultimately Brussels's chief role regarding protection of
older workers may only be to coordinate propaganda stressing the aged's
concerns.30 6 To this end, the Social Action Program suggests that 1993
be labeled "a year for the elderly." 07
Unless Brussels decides to impose a minimum employer-provided
pension benefit, the thrust of the Charter's age protections would not
likely change the terms of EC employment. Increased state-guaranteed
benefits could, however, affect the EC's tax structure, raising the cost of
doing business in Europe.
12. Protection of the Handicapped
Like its protections for the aged, the Charter-granted rights for the
handicapped30 8 amount more to a statement of social policy than to a
body of anti-discrimination prohibitions directly affecting employment.
United States law, especially under the new Americans with Disabilities
Act,3 "9 differs, actively prohibiting discrimination against the handi-
capped in employment. And under United States law, "handicapped"
often includes alcoholics, drug addicts, and victims of long-term diseases,
including AIDS.31 0
The thrust of the Charter's proposals for the "disabled" would be
304 See supra note 154.
305 Social Action Program, supra note 99, at 52.
306 Id.
307 Id. This is not to minimize the growing belief within the EC that a problem of workplace age
discrimination indeed does exist. See Lublin, Graying Europeans Battling Age Bias, Wall St. J., Aug.
14, 1990, at Bl, col. 3 ("Rampant age bias against [employing] older Europeans is just starting to
decline.... Unlike America, Europe lacks tough laws broadly barring age discrimination."); cf The
Future of Europe's Elderly, Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 1990, at A10, col. 2 (according to Italian demogra-
pher, "there will be problems if [EC] governments fail to adopt a long-term strategy" regarding
employment of the aged).
308 Charter, supra note 99, at 26. On EC protections for the handicapped before the Charter,
see COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TEACHING AND TRAINING THE HANDI-
CAPPED THROUGH NEW INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (1984).
309 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336 (1990) [hereinafter ADA].
This U.S. law protects as "handicaps" alcoholism, certain forms of drug addiction, and transmissible
diseases. The prior, and still-effective, U.S. federal handicap statute applicable to the U.S. govern-
ment and its contractors is the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.
310 See supra note 309. See generally Lawson, AIDS, Astrology, and Arline: Towards a Causal
Interpretation of Section 504, 17 HoFsTRA L. Rav. 237, 275-298 (1989) (demonstrating application
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measures "improving" the disabled's "social and professional integra-
tion" through EC-level programs fostering "vocational training, ergo-
nomics, accessibility, mobility, means of transport, and housing."31 1 The
Social Action Program focuses especially on the goal of improving the
handicapped's mobility: "Making it easier for disabled people to travel is
an essential prerequisite for vocational training and employment."'3 12 As
with other of the Charter's social platforms, EC programs furthering
these goals likely could effect the tax structure, raising the cost of doing
business in the EC. Yet these proposals do not seem likely to give rise to
any new area of anti-discrimination law.313
IV. How POST-1992 EC SOCIAL LAW MIGHT AFFECT UNITED
STATES-BASED EMPLOYERS OF EUROPEANS
Because the Charter and the Social Action Program spell out Brus-
sels's vision of employee rights after 1992, the documents do not focus on
how the proposed social regulations might effect a business's ability to
earn a profit while simultaneously employing an EC-regulated work
force. Yet the Charter and the Social Action Program do reveal, when
analyzed in the context of prior EC statements and regulations in the
Charter's twelve areas, how future regulation under the Charter most
likely will affect the costs of EC employment.
A. Charter Rights Raising the Cost of Doing Business
Some of the proposed Charter rights would directly affect employ-
ment relationships, but others would only affect state-provided social
benefits. Insofar as these other rights would give rise to EC-level social
programs funded from the tax base, they might increase the cost of doing
business in Europe.31 4 However, these rights would not likely raise mar-
ginal European employment costs much, if only because social program
of landmark U.S. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 hepatitis-as-handicap decision, School Board v. Arline,
480 U.S. 273 (1987), to AIDS).
311 Charter, supra note 99, at 26.
312 Social Action Program, supra note 99, at 53.
313 In a sense, the EC's policy toward the handicapped - affirmative assistance rather than nega-
tive prohibitions of discrimination - parallels U.S. federal policy before the ADA (supra note 309):
Before the ADA, the chief U.S. federal statute regarding the handicapped in employment was the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (supra note 309). The Rehabilitation Act's text is devoted almost wholly
to affirmative handicap "rehabilitation" programs, and not to discrimination provisions. Those few
discrimination provisions in the Act apply only to the federal government and certain federal con-
tractors. See supra note 309.
314 How the EC raises its budget from the member states is beyond the scope of this article. Of
course, taxes paid to member states which ultimately finance EC programs come from EC taxpayers.
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funding is already high in most EC member states;315 theoretically, a true
"approximation" of social programs need not raise total costs at all.
Examples of such social benefits not directly affecting marginal em-
ployment costs include the Charter's called-for rights to social protec-
tions of youth,316 the aged,317 and the disabled.318  Because the EC
already oversees aspects of social security and certain national welfare
systems, 319 at best these new rights would only "approximate" national
social welfare systems into a single broad-based protection covering citi-
zens of all twelve member states. As such, these Charter rights need not
change the overall balance between the EC member states' tax base and
the programs it supports - although these rights would likely affect this
balance in the less paternalistic countries.320 At best, these rights could
spawn more efficient social programs, consolidating and streamlining du-
plicative national programs. At worst, though, the new EC systems
would impose new costs, to be spread among all taxpayers, including
employers.
B. Charter Rights Affecting the Marginal Cost of EC Employment
The bulk of the Charter's worker rights would come at the direct
expense of EC employers. For example, the Charter's right to "fair re-
muneration" 32 1 would regulate employer-paid wages. High wage mini-
mums could prove expensive to those employing unskilled and short-
term workers. As another example, the Charter's right to "improved
working conditions' 322 could impose substantial new costs on employers
- yet in the absence of a complete set of regulations, how onerous this
right will be is difficult to assess. As envisioned under the Charter, the
right to improved working conditions would include rights to annual va-
cation leave and weekly rest periods.323 At least initially, this could
prove burdensome to those United States-based employers still unused to
the liberal vacation and leave policies standard in much of Europe.324
315 See supra § III(C)(4), and citations therein.
316 See supra § III(C)(10).
317 See supra § III(C)(1 1).
318 See supra § III(C)(12).
319 See supra § III(C)(4).
320 As a general rule, taxes are lower in jurisdictions which fund fewer social programs.
321 See supra § III(C)(2).
322 See supra § III(C)(3).
323 See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
324 As any North American who has traveled through Europe in August is aware, EC member
state tradition strongly supports generous annual vacation time. Indeed, the Treaty itself regulates
"holiday schemes." Treaty, supra note 99, at art. 120.
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Similar is the Charter's right to vocational training.325 Depending
on the extent to which the EC requires industry to implement the Char-
ter's called-for training programs, and depending on how liberally Brus-
sels interprets its right of worker "leaves" for training,326 the right to
vocational training could prove expensive for employers. While better-
trained workers could certainly be an asset for certain businesses, how
expensive - and expansive - the EC's vocational training right will be
remains to be seen.
Also, the Charter's protections of health and safety in the work-
place 327 could prove costly, at least for a United States-based employer
starting up direct operations in Europe. Substantive differences between
United States and EC workplace safety regulations could impose on cer-
tain United States-based employers, such as those in heavy manufactur-
ing, the burden of translating one set of safe work practices into another.
C. Charter Rights Affecting Legal Liability and the Structure of EC
Labor Law
The sections of the Charter and Social Action Program most likely
to affect employers of Europeans directly are those worker "rights"
which could give rise to new employer liabilities, and those "rights"
which would alter the form of labor law in the member states. One such
right is the Charter's call to abolish sex discrimination,328 insofar as em-
ployers found to have violated this will be liable for damages. 329 How-
ever, because similar anti-discrimination provisions already exist in the
EC - and, for that matter, in the United States - this right should not
radically affect those employers which already strive for sex-neutral hir-
ing, pay, promotion, benefits, and training programs.330
EC social rights more likely to burden employers are those propos-
als which would contravene the "subsidiarity" concept 331 and impose an
EC-structured labor law on the existing order of employment relations
within the member states. A basic example is the Charter's grant of col-
lective bargaining rights, under which Brussels would effectively protect
332
unions. By promoting a labor/management dialogue at the "Euro-
325 See supra § III(C)(6).
326 Id.
327 See supra § III(B)(9).
328 See supra § III(C)(7).
329 See supra note 252.
330 See supra text accompanying notes 246-250.
331 See supra note 154.
332 See supra § III(C)(5).
616
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pean level," '333 Brussels might actively re-order existing bargaining rela-
tionships. Yet how much coordinated EC-wide determination of worker
rights really will occur remains to be seen. At least in the single market's
early years, the EC collective bargaining right may mean little more than
Brussels's promotion of labor representation. Collectively-bargained de-
terminations of workplace conditions for most European workers could
well remain local for some time.
334
Potentially farther-reaching is the call for a worker consultation and
participation scheme;335 indeed, worker consultation and participation is
the single market program's most volatile employment-related mea-
sure.336 While many corporations, especially multinationals based off the
continent, are attracted to the possibility of an EC-wide corporate status,
such corporations are understandably reluctant to accept labor represent-
atives on their boards, or even to share information and decision-making
with worker representatives. This is especially true to the extent that the
Charter and Social Action Program reject the historic link between EC-
wide corporate status and worker participation.3 7 United States-based
corporations, which have no tradition of worker participation, 338 seem
particularly loath to grant foreign labor a say in corporate policy. To
some extent, the international law doctrine of sovereignty may support
these United States employers.339 Yet how extensive the ultimately-en-
acted EC version of worker consultation and participation will be re-
mains an unsettled, hotly debated issue.
D. Benefits the Charter Would Confer on EC Employers
Because the Charter and Social Action Program focus on worker
and not employer rights,3 40 these documents for the most part read as
business-restrictive. Yet the EC's proposed social program would actu-
ally confer some benefits on those employing Europeans after 1992. Pri-
marily, the Charter's first right, to freedom of movement, 34 1 would be a
333 See supra note 234 and accompanying text
334 One collective bargaining issue which might have more immediate impact, however, is the
Social Action Program's proposal to require that employers issue documentation to workers proving
they have an employment "contract." See supra note 215 and accompanying text. Employers fear
this proposal could be a back-door attempt to force them to "recognize" collective bargaining rela-
tionships where none would otherwise exist.
335 See supra note 215; see also supra § III(C)(8).
336 See supra notes 257-264 and accompanying text.
337 See supra notes 269-276 and accompanying text.
338 See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
339 See supra notes 279-280 and accompanying text.
340 See supra § II(D).
341 See supra § III(C)(1).
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boon to any employer with trans-European operations, because it would
allow greater staffing flexibility among the member states.
Additionally, the Charter and Social Action Program send some
positive signals to United States employers through what they omit. The
Charter and the Social Action Program are silent on several areas in
which United States employers bear heavy domestic burdens; most nota-
ble is the virtual absence of anti-discrimination law.342 Even the pro-
posed protections for the young, the aged, and the disabled343 do not
seem headed toward the extensive United States regulation of employ-
ment decisions arguably involving age or handicap, under the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act,344 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 34
the Americans with Disabilities Act,34" and analogous state laws.
347
Similarly, although much of the Charter and Social Action Program
aims at guaranteeing increased benefits for workers, nothing in the docu-
ments raises the specter of benefit plan liability analogous to United
States law under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act.348
And nothing in the Charter or Social Action Program approaches the
magnitude of United States prohibitions, under Title V11 349 and analo-
gous state laws, 350  against race, nationality, and religious
discrimination.351
342 Cf. supra note 196. See generally Social Action Program, supra note 99, at 5 ("the Commis-
sion is not making a proposal in respect of discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, or reli-
gion.. ."). Generally, the Charter and Social Action Program aim at providing positive benefits to
workers, while U.S. employment law imposes negative prohibitions on employers. This philosophical
difference may be a result of the difference between civil law and common law jurisprudence: In civil
law systems, affirmative rights effectively arise from codes; under common law, citizens' acts are all
legal unless specifically prohibited by statute or otherwise. See generally supra notes 30-34 and ac-
companying text. Still, the Charter and Social Action Program would not override more worker-
protective anti-discrimination laws internal to any member state. On such laws in Britian, see, e.g.,
Fitzpatrick, Legislation: The Sex Discrimination Act of 1986, 50 MOD. L. REv. 934 (1987); Pannett,
Whom Does the Race Relations Act Cover?, 133 SOLIC. J. 855 (1989).
343 See supra §§ III(C)(10) - III(C)(12).
344 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.
345 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.
346 Pub. L. No. 101-336 (1990).
347 See supra note 250. The Charter and Social Action Program actively prohibit sex discrimina-
tion, but this EC-law prohibition effectively predates these two documents. See supra § III(C)(7).
348 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq.
349 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17. See generally supra note 247 and accompanying text.
350 See supra note 250.
351 The Charter would, however, grant employment rights to EC citizens regardless of their
member state affiliations. See supra § III(C)(1). On sex discrimination, see supra note 347.
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V. CONCLUSION: THE COMING BATTLE BETWEEN BRUSSELS AND
THE MEMBER STATES, AND THE OUTLOOK FOR EC LABOR
AND SOCIAL REGULATION
Perhaps the most important principle to be gleaned from the Char-
ter and Social Action Program comes not from the documents them-
selves, but from the political battle surrounding them.35 2 Because each
of the twelve member states which make up the EC has a distinct social
and labor relations tradition,3 53 legislating a single, harmonious labor
and social rights program may be among the most difficult tasks facing
Brussels before the end of 1992. 354
While in the final two years of the single market program an intense
battle still raged over the Charter's legal status,35 5 the Commission and
Council were nevertheless almost sure to draft and approve some com-
prehensive social legislation for a post-1992 "social Europe." But what
the specifics of this legislation would be, and whether the Charter's
twelve rights would chiefly be enforced at the EC level or be deferred to
the member states under the "subsidiarity" doctrine,3 56 still remained
open questions in the final years leading up to December 31, 1992.
By the early 1990's, the previous quandary over the meaning of "so-
cial Europe" had been clarified to a struggle over how broadly to imple-
ment twelve EC-level worker rights. The outcome of this struggle -
which may be all but determined by the end of 1992 - will necessarily
determine whether Brussels creates new socialized protections for all
Europeans, whether it retains for the member states control over key
labor and social issues, or whether it forges some different, compromise
position.
The socially-expansive mood among the EC decision-makers who
approved the Charter and drafted the Social Action Program357 virtually
352 See supra § II(D).
353 See supra § II(A).
354 See, e.g., More Rights for Workers, supra note 100 (detailing political problems Brussels faces
in resolving policy disputes between EC employers and EC labor). Perhaps the move toward a single
social policy is the most contentious issue facing European unity, apart from the issue of the single
EC currency and monetary union. See Stephens, Thatcher Set for Vigorous Defence of Stance on
EMU, The Financial Times (London), Oct. 30, 1990, at 1, col. 6. See generally citations supra at
note 103.
355 See supra note 181; see also supra § II(D).
356 See supra note 154.
357 As a reading of the Charter and the Social Action Program shows, the mood motivating
"social Europe" is an expansive one. The November 1990 resignation of Margaret Thatcher could
also spur faster growth toward a "social Europe." Yet, the events in Eastern Europe of 1989 and the
reunification of Germany in October 1990, plus the Mideast war and threatened recession of 1990-
1991, could cause economic conservatism in Brussels. This may, in turn, slow down the "social
Europe" movement - at least insofar as the Charter and Social Action Program propose sweeping
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assures that the costs of employing EC workers, and of doing business in
the EC generally, will remain high after 1992.358 Yet, however expensive
the regulation under the Charter and Social Action Program proves to
be, these two documents will likely achieve their purpose, strengthening
the labor and social fabric of Europe. Possibly, the EC's hybrid eco-
nomic system, which combines free market principles with broad state-
provided social protections, 359 will produce real benefits for the EC em-
ployment market - however difficult such benefits may be for a United
States free market capitalist to appreciate in the abstract. To this extent,
Brussels's "social Europe" program could actually afford employers
based outside the EC a favorable European workplace environment well
after 1992.
tax-funded programs. But cf. supra note 110 (on connection between EC economy and Eastern
Europe).
358 By U.S. standards, employment costs in Europe are already high. See supra notes 314-315
and accompany text.
359 As this article attempts to show, the EC's vision of "social Europe" is inconsistent with an
unregulated, purely-free-market ideal. Yet the EC's own Treaty requires that directives on labor and
social issues "shall avoid imposing administrative, financial, and legal constraints in a way which
would hold back the creation and development of small and medium-sized undertakings." Treaty,
supra note 45, at art. 118a, 2. Businesses in the EC, including those based in the U.S., have a keen
interest in seeing Brussels live up to this provision.
